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Professional liability insurance policies customarily provide
coverage to health-care workers for damage awards intended to
compensate injuries stemming from professional negligence or
malpractice.' In the case in which a health-care provider engages in
sexual contact with a patient, the threshold issue in subsequent civil
litigation becomes whether the coverage provisions of the policy
indemnify such behavior as being part of the professional services
rendered. The coverage determination often turns on the precise
nature of the sexual abuse and the type of medical practice involved.'
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See Christopher Vaeth, Annotation, Coverage of Professional-Liabilityor -Indemnity
Policyfor Sexual Contact with Patientsby Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers, 60 A.L.R.
5th 239, 239 (1998). Most policies offer the provider of health services protection
for "bodily injury arising out of the rendering of or failure to render professional
services." David S. Florig, Insurance Coveragefor Sexual Abuse or Molestation, 30 TORT &
INS. L.J. 699, 721 (1995).
See Vaeth, supra note 1, at 255. In addition, the coverage determination
frequently depends on the construction of the policy language "rendering or failure
to render professional services" as applied to the particular circumstances of the case.
Id.
Many courts have adopted the description of "professional services" as
announced by the court in Marx v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 157 N.W.2d 870,
871-72 (Neb. 1968). SeeFlorig, supra note 1, at 721. The Nebraska Supreme Court in
Marx stated:
The insurer's liability is thus limited to the performing or rendering of
"professional" acts or services. Something more than an act flowing
from mere employment or vocation is essential. The act or service
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Psychotherapists often have been afforded professional liability
protection for acts of sexual misconduct with patients because the
development of intense emotional relationships are expected within
the confines of counseling, and patients often exhibit strong
emotional feelings toward their therapists - a phenomenon known
as transference.5
It is well established that a mental health
professional's mishandling of the transference phenomenon
resulting in sexual contact with the patient constitutes gross
negligence or malpractice,6 and professional liability insurance
policies usually afford coverage in these situations.7
must be such as exacts the use or application of special learning or
attainments of some kind. The term "professional" in the context used
in the policy provision means something more than mere proficiency
in the performance of a task and implies intellectual skill as contrasted
with that used in an occupation for production or sale of commodities.
A "professional" act or service is one arising out of a vocation, calling,
occupation, or employment involving specialized knowledge, labor, or
skill, and the labor or skill involved is predominantly mental or
intellectual, rather than physical or manual. In determining whether a
particular act is of a professional nature or a "professional service" we
must look not to the title or character of the party performing the act,
but to the act itself.
Marx, 157 N.W.2d at 871-72 (citations omitted).
See Florig, supra note 1, at 721. Generally, the courts have been divided on the
issue of whether a health-care provider's sexual misconduct falls within coverage
provisions of malpractice insurance policies. See id. See generally Vaeth, supra note 1.
See Vaeth, supranote 1, at 239.
5 See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1622 (25th ed. 1990).
"Transference" is
defined as "[d]isplacement of affect from one person or one idea to another; in
psychoanalysis, generally applied to the projection of feelings, thoughts and wishes
onto the analyst, who has come to represent some person from the patient's past."
Id. Transference is "[t]he process whereby the patient displaces onto the therapist
feelings, attitudes and attributes which properly belong to a significant attachment
figure of the past, usually a parent, and responds to the therapist accordingly." St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Love, 459 N.W.2d 698, 700 (Minn. 1990) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted); see also Linda Jorgenson et al., Therapist-PatientSexual
Exploitation and InsuranceLiability, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 595, 597 (1992). Transference
is not limited to psychoanalytical situations and may be seen in any professional
relationship in which trust and confidence is placed in the person of relative
authority, and good faith is assumed. SeeJorgenson et al., supra, at n.9.
6 See Love, 459 N.W.2d at 700; see also N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 35-6.3(j)
(1994).
The New Jersey State Board of Medical Examiners' (Board) regulation on sexual
misconduct states that "violation of any prohibitions or directives set forth ... shall
be deemed to constitute gross or repeated malpractice." Id.; see also L.L. v. Medical
Protective Co., 362 N.W.2d 174, 176 (Wis. 1984) (declaring that "[m]edical
authorities are nearly unanimous in considering sexual contact between therapist
and patient to be malpractice"); Jorgenson et al., supra note 5, at 595-96. Patienttherapist sex is "considered unethical by the major mental health organizations,
considered unanimously by medical authorities to constitute malpractice, and in
some jurisdictions is a criminal offense." Id. (footnotes omitted). The main remedy
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For health-care providers outside the mental health area, the
insurer's duty to defend or indemnify generally has been found in
cases in which the sexual abuse "was so intertwined with, and
inseparable from, the medical act as to be part of the rendering of
professional services."8
These cases typically involve the
inappropriate touching of sexual organs during treatment - such as
during a gynecologic examination - or furthering the molestation
by administering drugs or anesthesia.9 Occasionally, an insurance
contract expressly provides coverage for injuries resulting from
volitional acts in the course of patient care, including acts of unlawful
or inappropriate physical contact.'0
When the policy language
expresses an intent to indemnify for harm resulting from such acts
committed during the course of patient care, and no intent to injure
is found, a court may hold the insurer to the bargain struck and find
coverage for compensatory damages."
for patients falling victim to this abuse is a professional negligence action and, in
fact, such suits are the leading cause of all malpractice claims for private
psychotherapists. See id. at 596-97.
See Florig, supra note 1, at 727; see also Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Employers Ins. of
Wausau, 626 F. Supp. 262, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that there must be coverage
when psychiatrist mishandled transference phenomenon because sexual activity
deemed sufficiently related to professional services); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
v. Mitchell, 296 S.E.2d 126, 128 (Ga. CL App. 1982) (requiring carrier to defend
psychiatrist against claims of sexual misconduct resulting from mishandling of
transference phenomenon because such claims arguably arise out of the
performance of professional services); Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753, 761-62
(Mo. 1968) (stating that psychiatrist's mishandling of the transference phenomenon
resulting in sexual relations with patient constituted professional services within the
coverage provisions, and the damages suffered were directly and proximately
connected with the professional services).
9 Florig, supra note 1, at 721 (discussing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Asbury, 720 P.2d 540 (Ariz. CL App. 1986)).
9 See id.; see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Shernow, 610 A.2d
1281, 1282
(Conn. 1992) (requiring coverage for injuries sustained by patient when insured
dentist sexually assaulted her during course of treatment, overcoming resistance
through the misuse of anesthesia); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Torpoco, 879
S.W.2d 831, 834 (Tenn. 1994) (finding an obligation on the part of the insurer to
defend physician when a medically negligent procedure is so inextricably intertwined
and inseparable from the alleged intentional sexual assault). In Torpoco, the court
noted that the duty to defend the insured is determined entirely by the allegations as
pleaded, while the obligation to indemnify depends on the true facts proven at trial.
See Torpoco, 879 S.W.2d at 835 ("[T]he duty to defend is [thus] broader than the duty
to pay or indemnify.").
See Public Service MuL Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 425 N.E.2d 810, 813 (N.Y. 1981).
In addition to providing liability coverage for claims based on malpractice,
negligence, error, or mistake, the policy at issue in Goldfarb also expressly covered
acts of assault, slander, libel, and undue familiarity occurring during the rendering
of dental services. See id.
1 See id. at 815. The court held that public policy did not preclude coverage for

136

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 30:133

The majority rule for cases outside the field of mental health,
however, is that medical malpractice policies do not provide coverage
for sexual abuse of patients by health-care providers; such sexual
misconduct does not constitute the rendering of professional services
as contemplated by the policies. 12 The prevailing view is also that
sexual misconduct is not a medical incident for coverage purposes
unless the physician is a psychiatrist and the conduct occurs in a
therapeutic relationship. 3
Other courts have determined that
professional liability coverage for intentional acts is further
prohibited on the basis that indemnification
for one's own
14
intentional misconduct violates public policy.
Professional-liability policies sometimes contain exclusion
provisions precluding coverage for criminal or intentional acts; even
malpractice policies written for mental health professionals may
include a sexual acts exclusion or sexual misconduct sublimit."5
compensatory damages arising from the intentional act because no intent to cause
injury
had been found (i.e., intentional acts causing unintended injury). See id.
12
See Florig, supra note 1, at 721-27; see also supra note 2 and accompanying
text
(discussing judicial interpretations of "professional services"); St. Paul Ins. Co. of I11.
v. Cromeans, 771 F. Supp. 349, 352-53 (N.D. Ala. 1991) (holding that insurer was
under no duty to defend or indemnify physician who sexually abused two minor
females because insuring against intentional misconduct is against public policy,
such coverage could not plausibly be held to have been within the contemplation of
the parties when the contract was entered, and the alleged acts of sexual abuse are
not professional services); Hirst v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 683 P.2d 440, 444
(Idaho Ct. App. 1984) (finding that, although insurer was obligated to defend
doctor, there was no duty to indemnify because alleged acts of sexual assault fell
outside scope of professional services); Niedzielski v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
589 A.2d 130, 133 (N.H. 1991) (finding that, even though sexual assault of minor
patient took place in dentist's office, insured not afforded liability coverage because
assault did not arise out of professional service); New Mexico Physicians Mut. Liab.
Co. v. LaMure, 860 P.2d 734, 742 (N.M. 1993) (deciding that physician was not
covered under malpractice policy for sexual assault on minor because such
misconduct was not within the scope of professional services; criminal acts exclusion
upheld).
13 See Snyder v. Major, 789 F. Supp. 646, 649,
651 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[H]aving sex
with a patient is not a part of the delivery of professional services .. ").
14 See, e.g., Cromeans, 771 F. Supp. at 352.
One court held that no valid insurance
coverage could exist to indemnify against a loss that the insured purposefully and
willfully created by misconduct patently immoral, fraudulent, or felonious, because
to do so would violate public policy. See id. The court further stated that the parties
to the insurance contract intended coverage for harm negligently caused in the
course of medical treatment for a medical ill and not for doctor's intentional acts
directed toward his patient in furtherance of his own prurient interests and sexual
lust. See id.
15 See Vaeth, supra note 1, at 317-66. A sexual misconduct
sublimit is a special
policy provision limiting liability coverage "to a lesser amount whenever a claim
against the insured" psychotherapist involved sexual misconduct. Id. at 341. The
trend has been for insurers to exclude coverage or cap their financial liability for
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Court decisions have varied in deciding whether to uphold such
exclusions or limitations. 6 Cases determining that health-care
provider sexual misconduct was not excluded from coverage under
the policy's criminal
acts exclusion provision have generally involved
• 17
psychotherapists.
Other courts addressing criminal acts exclusions
in cases involving those other than mental health practitioners have
upheld these provisions and excluded professional liability coverage
for the sexual misconduct of the health-care provider. 8
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Ambassador Insurance Co. v.
Montes, 9 provided another possible approach for courts to follow
when considering indemnification issues in cases involving
intentional wrongdoing.20 The Ambassador court proffered that, when
an innocent person is injured as a result of the criminal acts of the
insured, the insurance company should make payment to the injured
party as long as the benefit does not inure to the insured
2
wrongdoer.
' By subrogating the insurer to the injured party's rights,
sexual misconduct claims brought against their insured psychotherapists, and in
some cases these provisions have been effective bars to patient damage recoveries.
SeeJorgenson et al., supra note 5, at 614. In other cases, however, insurers have not
escaped liability when patients have alleged other acts of negligence, such as
abandonment, committed concurrently with the sexual misconduct. See id.
16 See Vaeth, supra note 1, at 317-66 (surveying case law regarding
validity of such
exclusions).
17 See id. at 330-32; see also Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Kambly,
319 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Mich.
App. 1982). The court in Kambly, in finding that the psychiatrist's alleged sexual
misconduct constituted malpractice, declined to distinguish this type of malpractice
from others and determined that the defense expenses incurred by the doctor were
incurred as a result of alleged malpractice, and not alleged criminal activity. See
Kambly, 319 N.W.2d at 385. The court decided not to read such an exemption into
the policy because the insurance policies "must be construed in favor of the insured
to uphold coverage" and "limitations in the policy must be clearly expressed." Id.
See Vaeth, supra note 1, 326-30; see, e.g., New Mexico Physicians Mut. Liab. Co.
v. LaMure, 860 P.2d 734 (N.M. 1993). The physician in LaMure had been convicted
of the sexual assault of a minor. See id.at 735-36. In denying coverage based on the
unambiguous language of the criminal acts exclusion and the finding that the sexual
assault did not constitute "professional services" under the policy's coverage
provision, the court opined that its decision "supports the public policy of preventing
an insured from being shielded from the negative consequences of his crimes, and of
enforcing fair private contracts as written absent conflicting statutorily expressed
public policy." Id. at 742.
76 NJ. 477, 388 A.2d 603 (1978).
20 See id. at 484, 388 A.2d
at 606.
21 See id.
Although the Ambassador Insurance Co. v. Montes case involved the
general liability policy of a landlord convicted of intentionally burning down his own
tenement, its applicability to professional liability policy situations has already been
proposed. See Assembly 1998, 208th Leg. (NJ. 1998) (proposed bill introduced May
4, 1998 and endorsing in its summary statement the application of Ambassador to
medical malpractice situations).
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thus allowing the carrier to be reimbursed by the insured wrongdoer,
equity would be served.2 In this context, the public policy principle
that an insured may not be relieved of economic responsibility for his
own criminal conduct would not be violated.2 s Also, this scheme24
would advance the public interest in compensating innocent victims.
It should be noted that, on May 4, 1998, the 208th Legislature of the
State of New Jersey introduced Assembly Bill No. 1998 with an intent
to legislatively undo the result in Princeton Insurance Co. v.
Chunmuang, by adopting the Ambassadorcourt's approach.26
Studies have indicated that a small but significant minority of
physicians have engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with
patients. 7
Despite the American Medical Association's 1991
publication of ethical guidelines regarding sexual contact with
patients, 28 the New Jersey State Board of Medical Examiners (Board)
continued to receive complaints alleging physician sexual activity with
See Ambassador,76 N.J. at 484, 388 A.2d at 606.
23

See id.

See id., 388 A.2d at 606-07.
151 N.J. 80, 698A.2d 9 (1997).
26 See Assembly
1998, 208th Leg. (N.J. 1998) (proposed bill and summary
statement).
27 See Timothy Bayer et al., A National Survey
of Physicians' Behaviors Regarding
Sexual Contact With Patients, 89 S. MED. J. 977, 981 (Oct. 1996). This study revealed
that 4.5% of physicians responding to the survey reported having dated a patient,
and 3.4% reported having sexual contact with patients, with nearly all cases involving
male physicians and female patients. See id. at 980-81; see also Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs Report, American Medical Association, Sexual Misconduct in the Practice
of Medicine, 266 JAMA 2741, 2741 (1991) ("Studies of psychiatrists indicate that
between 5% and 10% reported having sexual contacts with patients ....
[T]he
percentages may be comparable for other specialties."). Researchers believe that
physician-patient sexual contact is underreported. See id.; see also Paul S. Appelbaum
et al., Sexual Relationships Between Physicians and Patients, 154 ARcH. INTERN. MED.
2561, 2562 (1994). In a 1973 study, 18% of obstetrician-gynecologists reported
engaging in erotic conduct with patients, followed by 13% of general practitioners,
12% of internists, 10% of psychiatrists, and 10% of surgeons reporting such behavior.
See id. Subsequent studies have consistently revealed that between 4% and 10% of
survey respondents admitted sexual contacts with former or current patients "with
little variation across specialties." Id.; see also Laurence B. McCullough et al., Ethically
Justified Guidelines for Defining Sexual Boundaries Between Obstetrician-Gynecologists and
Their Patients, 175 Am.J. OssmT. GYNECOL. 496, 496, 497 (1996) ("Obstetriciangynecologists appear no less at risk of sexual contact with patients than other medical
professionals.").
28 See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs Report, American
Medical
Association, supra note 27, at 2741 (concluding that "sexual contact or a romantic
relationship concurrent with the physician-patient relationship is unethical"); see also
The Hippocratic Oath ("I will come for the benefit of the sick, remaining free of all
intentional injustice, of all mischief and in particular of sexual relations with both
female and male persons....").
24
25
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patients." Although declaring that "sexual contact is in conflict with
the very essence of the practice of medicine[,]" the Board
promulgated its sexual misconduct regulation "to specifically notify
licensees of conduct which it deems to be violative of law and will
subject them to disciplinary action .... "
Research has indicated that "the effects of physician-patient
contact are almost universally negative or damaging to the patient.""'
See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 35-6.3 (1996) and app. (regarding sexual activity
between physicians and patients).
" Id. at app. Prior to the promulgation of the sexual misconduct regulation,
physicians generally were prosecuted for such behavior as professional misconduct
pursuant to title 45, section 1-21 (e) of the NewJersey Statutes (based on the Author's
firsthand experience as a member of the Board of Medical Examiners and Hearing
Officer for Open Disciplinary Proceedings). See, e.g., In re Revocation of License of
Polk, 90 NJ. 550, 449 A.2d 7 (1982) (upholding revocation of medical license for
sexual abuse of patients and finding physician's conduct constituted gross
malpractice under NJ. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-16(h) and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-21(c);
professional misconduct under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-21(e); repeated malpractice
under NJ. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-21(d); lack of good moral character under N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 45:9-6; and an inability to act in accordance with the public's safety, health,
and welfare under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-21(i)); In re Suspension or Revocation of
License of Costino (N.J. State Bd. of Med. Exam'r 1998) (final decision and order
rejecting conclusion of law of administrative law judge, reprimanding physician for
sexual activity with two patients, and finding conduct constituted professional
29

misconduct pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-21(e)); In re Suspension or Revocation
of License of Schermer (N.J. State Bd. Med. Exam'r 1994) (final decision and order
adopting administrative law judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law, revoking
psychiatrist's medical license for sexual involvement with multiple female patients,
and finding that physician engaged in gross and repeated malpractice in violation of
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-21 (c) and (d) and professional misconduct in violation of N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 45:1-21 (e)).
Furthermore, the Board suspended Dr. Frank Brigio's medical license for
indiscriminate prescribing of controlled substances and for sexual relations with a
patient. See In re Suspension or Revocation of License of Brigio (N.J. State Bd. Med.
Exam'r 1992) (final order) ("[T]here is no such thing as a consensual sexual
relationship between a physician and a patient. Such a relationship is inherently
coercive as the physician is totally in control and empowered [by] the superior
knowledge of the physician and the needs of the patient . . . ."). The Board
determined that Brigio's sexual relationship with a patient constituted professional
misconduct under title 45, section 1-21(e) of the New Jersey Statutes. See In re Brigio
(order of partial summary decision); see also In re Suspension or Revocation of
License of Ferrari (N.J. State Bd. Med. Exam'r 1994) (consent order accepting
voluntary surrender of podiatrist's license with prejudice, and finding that licensee's
sexual relations with a patient violated N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-21(e)); Summary of
Sexual Misconduct Regulation, 28 N.J. Reg. 65 (1996) (proposed Jan. 2, 1996 and
codified at NJ. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 35-6.3). In the summary of the regulatory
proposal, the Board announced that the new rule would "codify long established
standards for its licensees barring sexual contact with patients." Id.
31 Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs Report, American Medical Association,
supranote 27, at 2742-43. Regarding patient harm resulting from sexual contact with
physicians, the report stated:
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While recognizing this well-documented harm, opinion varies upon
whether medical malpractice insurance proceeds should be used to
32
compensate victims of sexual abuse committed by physicians.
Finally, it has yet to be determined how judicial interpretation of this
issue will be affected by the recent NewJersey legislation that requires
medical malpractice insurance for physicians, surgeons, and
podiatrists.33
[F]emale patients tended to feel angry, abandoned, humiliated,
mistreated, or exploited by their physicians.
Victims have been
reported to experience guilt, severe distrust of their own judgment and
mistrust of both men and physicians. Patients who have been involved
in therapist-patient sexual relationships can suffer from depression,
anxiety, sexual disorders, sleeping disorders, and cognitive
dysfunctions and are

at risk for substance

abuse .

.

.

. [T]he

psychological impact of physician-patient sexual contact was negative..
• regardless of the type of practitioner involved ....

[T]he risks posed

to patient well-being due to loss of professional objectivity are equal
regardless of the physician's specialty.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Appelbaum et al., supra note 27, at 2562-64. Sexual
contact between patients and physicians "has long term adverse psychosocial impact
similar to rape or incest." H. Russell Searight & David C. Campbell, Physician-Patient
Sexual Contact: Ethical and Legal Issues and Clinical Guidelines, 36 J. FAMILY PRACnCE
647, 651 (1993). Psychotherapy patients experience serious negative effects from
sexual involvement with their therapists, including panic attacks, flashbacks, extreme
guilt, and self-destructive feelings, similar to sequelae seen with post-traumatic stress
disorder. See id.
32 See Open Board Minutes, New Jersey State Board of Medical
Examiners, June
10, 1998. After much discussion on Assembly Bill 1998, the Board voted to table
comment on the bill to obtain further information, noting various and divergent
opinions on the issue. See id. The Author, as chairman to the Board discussion of
this matter during the open public comment portion of the meeting, heard the
opinion of Neil Weisfeld, Executive Director of the Medical Society of NewJersey, on
behalf of the Medical Society. Mr. Weisfeld voiced opposition to proposed Assembly
Bill 1998, citing, as one reason, an anticipated rise in malpractice policy premiums if
coverage for criminal acts is required by law.
ss See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-19.17 (West 1998) and N.J. STAT. ANN. §
45:5-5.3
(West 1998) (requiring medical malpractice insurance or a comparable letter of
credit for physicians and podiatrists, respectively); see also Summary of Board of
Medical Examiners Regulation: Medical Malpractice Coverage; Letter of Credit, 30
N.J. Reg. 4318 (1998) (proposed Dec. 21, 1998 and codified at N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit.
13, § 35-6.18 (1999)). A 1998 summary of the Board's proposed rule requiring
physicians, surgeons, and podiatrists to obtain medical malpractice insurance or a
letter of credit states, in relevant part:
Social Impact
The Board of Medical Examiners proposes this new rule to implement
the legislation intended to protect the interests of patients in this State
who have been awarded judgments in medical malpractice cases ....
[T]he Board is providing a broad remedy for patients who may have
malpractice claims ....

Patients who prevail in malpractice cases will

now have a remedy, as negligent physicians will not be permitted to be
judgment proof ....
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Chunmuang, the target of proposed New Jersey Assembly Bill No.
1998, was decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court on August 8,
1997.3" The court recognized that New Jersey courts had not
previously addressed medical malpractice insurance coverage in
situations involving sexual assault of patients by physicians.3 5 The
Chunmuangcourt held that claims based on harm resulting from the
criminal behavior of a physician are properly denied coverage under
a professional liability insurance policy containing a criminal acts
exclusion provision. 6
In the fall of 1992, June Davis visited the professional office of
gynecologist Prasert Chunmuang, M.D. for an evaluation.
At the
time, Davis was seventeen years old, and this was her first
gynecological examination.
When Chunmuang entered the
Economic Impact
[T]he legislature determined that the economic interest of aggrieved
patients outweighs the cost of compliance to the regulated community
....
[T]he Board is implementing a legislative mandate that will
enable prevailing medical malpractice plaintiffs a ready remedy to
address the economic results of medical malpractice.
Id. at 4318-19.
34 See Princeton Ins. Co. v. Chunmuang, 151
N.J. 80, 698 A.2d 9 (1997); see also
Assembly 1998, 208th Leg. (N.J. 1998) (proposed bill and summary statement). The
summary statement of the proposed bill states:
The purpose of these [intentional or criminal acts] exclusions is to
prevent an insured from receiving a benefit, by way of financial
indemnity, for the damages caused by . . intentional or criminal acts.
However, as a result, a patient who is the victim of a practitioner's
criminal act, as well as malpractice, may not be able to receive payment
of proceeds of a medical malpractice liability insurance policy as
damages. This unfortunate outcome was demonstrated in the case of
Princeton InsuranceCompany v. Chunmuang, 151 N.J. 80 (1997) ....

This

bill seeks to correct the injustice of this situation by requiring payment
of medical malpractice policy proceeds to victims of criminal acts,
notwithstanding policy exclusions for criminal acts ....

[T]he insurer

would have a right of subrogation against the practitioner to collect the
sums paid.
The bill states that ensuring that innocent victims of criminal acts
are compensated is the public policy of this State.
Id.

See Chunmuang,151 N.J. at 93, 698 A.2d at 15.
See id, at 100, 698 A.2d at 19. The courts found that public policy was not
offended by such a provision and that, on remand, the plaintiff should be given an
opportunity to prove damages caused by the doctor's acts of medical negligence
separate and distinct from the harm flowing from the criminal act. See id. at 100-01,
698 A.2d at 19.
37 See Princeton Ins. Co. v. Chunmuang, 292
N.J. Super. 349, 352, 678 A.2d 1143,
1144 (App. Div. 1996).
38 See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 83, 698 A.2d at 10. The patient's presenting
complaint was abdominal cramping and lack of menstruation. See id.
35
36
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examination room he instructed Davis to disrobe. 9 Chunmuang,
however, did not promptly exit the room.' Feeling uncomfortable,
Davis did not undress until Chunmuang left the room. She closed
the door left ajar by Chunmuang." The examination commenced
with Davis in stirrups and Chunmuang initially utilizing an
instrument." The doctor then inserted his fingers inside Davis's
vagina and twisted his hand as he did so." Sensing these actions to be
inappropriate, she attempted to pull away." Chunmuang, however,
repeatedly pulled her down on the table toward him." During the
breast examination, Chunmuang persisted in rubbing her breasts in a
way Davis realized was inappropriate.
Although Davis was advised to return for another examination in
a few weeks, she did not return despite continued symptoms of
abdominal pain and lack of menstruation." The experience made
Davis feel "dirty" and "ashamed," and she was unable to seek further
gynecologic care as a result of the emotional distress caused by
Chunmuang's actions.49 Davis subsequently reported the incident to
the county prosecutor, who initiated criminal proceedings.'
In
39
40

Seeid

Se id.

41 Seeid.
42Seei.

See id.; Chunmuang, 292 N.J. Super. at 352, 678 A.2d at 1144. The instrument
used was a vaginal speculum. See In re Suspension or Revocation of License of
Chunmuang, OAL Dkt No. BDS 2234-93, at 9 (N.J. 1993) (Office of Admin. Law
Initial Decision) (identifying instrument as a vaginal speculum, which is used
routinely in gynecologic examinations).
See Chunmuang, 292 N.J. Super. at 352, 678 A.2d at 1144; see also McCullough et
al., supra note 27, at 497. In one study assessing harm to patients from sexual
molestation by gynecologists, the women reported unusually long examinations with
genital manipulation sometimes resulting in orgasm, absence of a nurse during
examinations, and inordinate amount of lubricant. See McCollough et al., supra, at
497. All patients reported feeling upset, dirty, degraded, humiliated, embarrassed,
confused, or nauseated. See id. ("The majority did not stop the examination because
they trusted the physician was conducting it ethically, felt powerless, or believed that
something was medically wrong" and "many avoided subsequent gynecologic care.").
See Chunmuang,151 N.J. at 83, 698 A.2d at 10.
See id. This continued for approximately five or ten minutes with Chunmuang
telling her "'Don't worry about it'" upon her attempts to withdraw. Id. During the
examination, Chunmuang asked Davis if she had a boyfriend and whether she had
sex with him. See id. When she replied that she was not sexually active, Chunmuang
asked her why she was not. See id.
47 See Chunmuang,292 N.J. Super. at 352, 678 A.2d at 1145.
See id.; see alo Chunmuang,151 N.J. at 84, 698 A.2d at 10-11.
49 See Chunmuang,292 N.J. Super. at 352-53, 678 A.2d at
1145.
50 See id. at 353, 678 A.2d at 1145. Other patients of Chunmuang also
had
reported to the prosecutor similar incidents, leading to the doctor's indictment on
4

1999]

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE

143

addition, the New Jersey Attorney General's office filed an
administrative complaint against Chunmuang before the New Jersey
State Board of Medical Examiners. The complaint resulted in the
revocation of Chunmuang's license to practice medicine and surgery
in the State of NewJersey. 5'
Davis instituted a civil suit against Chunmuang in 1994, alleging
medical malpractice, negligent and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, assault and battery, and sexual assault - all
relating to the gynecologic examination.5 2
She sought both
compensatory and punitive damages." Although Chunmuang was
several counts (including Davis's complaint). See id. Chunmuang subsequently
entered into a plea bargain arrangement in which he plead guilty to several counts of
the indictment. See id. The charge lodged by Davis was dismissed as part of the
agreement. See Chunmuang, 292 N.J. Super. at 353, 678 A.2d at 1145; Chunmuang,
151 N.J. at 84, 698 A.2d at 12.
See Chunmuang, 292 N.J. Super. at 353, 678 A.2d at 1145. The Attorney
General's verified complaint against Chunmuang was based on five incidents
involving five women, including Davis.
See id. The complaint alleged that
Chunmuang performed these gynecologic examinations "for the purpose of
'personal gratification."' Id.; see also Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 84, 698 A.2d at 11. The
four other patients went to Chunmuang long-term, and Davis was the only minor
patient involved in the complaint. See id., 698 A.2d at 12. The verified complaint
dated March 4, 1993 led to the Board's temporary suspension order of March 16,
1993. See id., 698 A.2d at 11. At the subsequent administrative hearing at which
Chunmuang testified, the administrative law judge found that Chunmuang
"'touched and rubbed the vaginas and breasts of four adult female patients in a
sexual manner or for sexual purposes, without medical purpose[.]"' Chunmuang,
292 N.J. Super. at 353, 678 A.2d at 1145 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Interestingly, at the administrative hearing, A.L.J. Gerson concluded that the
Attorney General did not meet its burden of proving the charge regarding Davis by a
preponderance of the credible evidence. See In re Suspension or Revocation of
License of Chunmuang, OAL Dkt No. BDS 2234-93, at 14 (N.J. 1993) (Office of
Admin. Law initial decision). In reaching this decision, the ALJ stated:
June D., who never had the experience of a pelvic exam before, was
understandably reluctant to cooperate with any of Dr. Chunmuang's
instructions .... Her demeanor at the time of her testimony [before
the ALJ] displayed a degree of volatility and belligerence that
undoubtedly would have been more pronounced [with Chunmuang]
given her nervousness at confronting her first internal pelvic exam ....
[I]t appears the resistance that June D. offered the doctor . .. could
well have led to her misconception that he was doing something other
than what would be considered standard for a gynecological exam.
Id. The testimony of Davis and Chunmuang also differed on whether Davis's mother
was present in the office during the examination. See id. Davis did not testify at the
license suspension proceeding before the Board. See Chunmuang,292 N.J. Super. at
353, 678 A.2d at 1145. In adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the
administrative law judge, the Board entered a final order on June 17, 1993 revoking
Chunmuang's medical license. See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 84, 698 A.2d at 11.
52 See Chunmuang,151 N.J. at 83, 698 A.2d at
9-10.
53 See id.
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served with the complaint, he did not file an answer. 4 The law
division ordered substituted service through Chunmuang's
professional liability insurance carrier, Princeton Insurance Company
(Princeton), which declined to answer the complaint or provide a
defense for the doctor.55 The law division entered a defaultjudgment
against Chunmuang, while Princeton instituted an action for
declaratory judgment seeking a determination that it was not
responsible to defend or indemnify Chunmuang for the damages
alleged by Davis.56 The court determined these damages in a separate
proof hearing and ultimately awarded Davis $50,000 in compensatory
damages and $50,000 in punitive damages.
In the declaratory judgment action before a separate law division
judge, summary judgment was entered in favor of Davis.54 Princeton
was found liable for the compensatory damages component of the
judgment.59 The court noted that the determination at the proof
hearing was that Chunmuang's examination of Davis amounted to
both a criminal act and an act of medical malpractice. Determining
that the compensatory damages awarded were based on acts of both
medical negligence and criminal conduct, while the punitive
damages were awarded based solely on the criminal acts, the court

See Chunmuang,292 N.J. Super. at 351, 678 A.2d at 1144.
See id
See id. Davis was named in the declaratory judgment complaint as an
interested party and provided an answer; Chunmuang did not answer the complaint.
See id.
57 See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 85, 698 A.2d at 11. Subsequent
to the filing of the
declaratory judgment action, Davis was granted a proof hearing on the default taken
against Chunmuang. See Chunmuang, 292 N.J. Super. at 351, 678 A.2d at 1144.
Princeton was served with notice of the hearing and, although it did not participate
in the proceedings, agreed to be bound by the findings of fact and conclusions of law
as determined by the law division judge. See id. at 352, 678 A.2d at 1144. Davis
testified at the proof hearing and also agreed to be bound by the court's
determinations. See id. The court determined that Chunmuang's conduct not only
deviated from accepted medical standards, but clearly amounted to a criminal act
and sexual assault. See id. at 353, 678 A.2d at 1145. The court was "'at a loss a little
bit as to what the compensatory damages should be"' because of Davis's ongoing
inability to seek further gynecologic care for definitive diagnosis and treatment.
Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 84-85, 698 A.2d at 11. The court thus did not apportion the
damages between the medical malpractice cause of action and the criminal sexual
assault component of the complaint. See id.
58 See Chunmuang, 292 N.J. Super. at 354, 678 A.2d
at 1145.
59
See id. In these proceedings, the court relied on a copy of the medical
malpractice policy issued to Chunmuang, Davis's complaint against the doctor,
transcripts of the proof hearing, and the parties' briefs. See id.
60 See
id.
5
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held that Princeton was obligated to satisfy the award for
compensatory damages."
Affirming the law division's decision, the appellate division
commenced its analysis by interpreting the terms of the malpractice
policy. 62 The majority construed the policy to mean that "there will
be coverage for 'injury' resulting from 'professional services' unless
the 'injury' results from a 'criminal act."' 63 The court adopted the
minority view as enunciated in St. PaulFire & Marine Insurance Co. v.
Asburly and held that, because the professional services performed
and the sexual assault committed on Davis were "intertwined and
inseparable," Princeton was required to provide coverage for Davis's
Although the appellate division
compensatory damages.65
acknowledged that the policy in Asbury did not contain a criminal acts
exclusion, the court stated that New Jersey insurance law favors

61 See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 85-86, 698 A.2d at 11-12.

Summary judgment was
granted to Princeton regarding its liability for the punitive damages because it was
determined that those damages were entirely the result of the criminal act. See id. at
85, 698 A.2d at 11. It should be noted that the appellate division's opinion is slightly
at odds with the supreme court's interpretation of the damage apportionment. The
appellate division concluded that 'Judge Mandak had awarded compensatory
damages for the [acts of] malpractice and punitive damages for the criminal act."
Chunmuang, 292 N.J. Super. at 354, 678 A.2d at 1145; cf. Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 85,
698 A.2d at 11. Judge Mandak "made no finding that any portion of the
compensatory damages was attributable to acts of medical malpractice distinct and
separate from the sexual assault, nor did Davis offer any evidence that would support
such a finding." Id.
62 See Chunmuang,292 N.J. Super. at 354, 678 A.2d at 1145. Under the indemnity
section, the policy states, in pertinent part: "We will pay all amounts up to the limit
of liability which you become legally obligated to pay as a result of injury ... caused
by a 'medical incident' arising out of your supplying or failure to supply professional
services." Chunmuang,151 N.J. at 85, 698 A.2d at 11. "Medical incident" is defined in
the policy as "any act or failure to act . . . in the furnishing of the professional
medical . . . services by you." Id. (alteration in original). The exclusions section of
the policy provides that the "insurance does not apply for: (a) injury resulting from
your performance of a criminal act." Id.
63 Chunmuang, 292 N.J. Super. at 354, 678 A.2d at 1146. Although Davis agreed
that Chunmuang's actions were criminal, she argued that her injuries resulted from
rendering of professional services because they occurred during a gynecologic
examination. See id.
64 720 P.2d 540 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). The St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Co. v.
Asbury court held that tortious conduct committed during the course of performing
gynecologic examinations was covered under the malpractice insurance policy
because the sexual abuse occurred during the course of providing professional
services and was "intertwined with and inseparable from the services provided." Id. at
542.
65 See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 86, 698 A.2d at 12.

146

[Vol. 30:133

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

finding coverage to protect the interests of innocent victims,
notwithstanding a criminal acts exclusion provision.6
Dissenting, Judge Keefe distinguished the case at bar from
Asbury noting that, unlike the policy in Asbury, Chunmuang's policy
contained an express exclusion clause for criminal acts.6 7 Based on

New
the dissent in the appellate division, Princeton appealed to the
6
granted.
was
certification
and
right,
of
as
Court
Jersey Supreme
The supreme court, finding it unnecessary to rely on the
"intertwined and inseparable" approach of Asbury, determined that a
fair reading of the policy at issue placed Chunmuang's conduct
within the definition of a "medical incident."6 9 The court determined
that a "substantial nexus" existed between the professional services
performed and the context in which the criminal acts occurred and,
but for the criminal acts exclusion, Chunmuang's criminal conduct
would be covered by the policy. 70 In upholding the validity of the
criminal acts provision, however, the court held that such exclusions
do not violate public policy and that the damages suffered by Davis
In reversing the appellate
were properly excluded from coverage.
division, the court remanded the matter to the law division to afford
Davis an opportunity to prove damages attributable solely to
Chunmuang's acts of malpractice that were separate and
independent from his criminal assault.7
See Chunmuang, 292 N.J. Super. at 356, 678 A.2d at 1146. The Asbury court,
cited with approval by the appellate division, further held that "the public policy of
Arizona favors protecting the interests of injured parties." Asbuly, 720 P.2d at 542; see
also Chunmuang, 292 NJ. Super at 356, 678 A.2d at 1147. When the criminal act is
not an inseparable part of the professional services, the exclusionary provision has
meaning. See id. The insurer, however, still bears the burden to show that the loss is
not covered. See id.
67 See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 86, 698 A.2d at 12. Judge Keefe opined that
deciding whether the "intertwined and inseparable" conduct was a covered "medical
incident" was irrelevant in this case because of the criminal acts exclusion. See id.
68 See id. at 83, 698 A.2d at 10.
60 See id. at 97-98, 698 A.2d at 18. "Medical incident" is defined, in pertinent part,
as "any act ...

in the furnishing of the professional medical .

.

. services by you[.]"

Chunmuang, 292 N.J. Super. at 354, 678 A.2d at 1146 (emphasis added) (alterations
in original). The court did not restrict the scope of the words "any act" to only those
acts which would be considered "professional" in nature. See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at
97, 698 A.2d at 18.
70 See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 97-98, 698 A.2d at 18. The court agreed with
the
"substantial nexus" approach in Records v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins., 294 N.J. Super.
463, 469, 683 A.2d 834, 837 (App. Div. 1996) (stating that "conduct which has a
substantial nexus to an insured activity may be found to 'arise out of that activity
even if it is unlawful").
71 See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 98, 100, 698 A.2d at 18, 19.
See id. at 100-01, 698 A.2d at 19.

1999)

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE

When interpreting professional liability insurance contracts,
courts generally have adhered to the rules of construction in
determining whether the health-care provider is afforded coverage
under indemnity provisions or denied coverage under intentional
74
acts exclusion provisions."7

Marx v. HartfordAccident & Indemnity Co.

is frequently cited by courts in deciding coverage issues. Although
Marx did not involve sexual misconduct," the case established a clear
definition of "professional services," a term commonly incorporated
into the coverage provisions of medical malpractice policies.76 The
policy language limited the insurer's liability to injuries arising out of
the performance of professional acts or services.
In deciding that
the insurer was not liable for the "non-professional," albeit negligent,
acts of an employee-technician, the court emphasized that a
professional act is one "arising out of a vocation, calling, occupation,
or employment" that involves "the use or application of special
learning or attainments," specialized knowledge, and intellectual
skills.78 The court further held that, when deciding whether certain
conduct constitutes a professional service, "we must look not to the
title or character of the party performing the act, but to the act
itself.""
A decade later, in Ambassador, the New Jersey Supreme Court
utilized an innovative approach to assign to the wrongdoer ultimate
financial responsibility for damages resulting from a criminal act,
while at the same time ensuring that innocent victims are
compensated." Although the policy at issue was a general liability
policy, its principles have been cited by the New Jersey courts and
New Jersey Legislature when considering medical malpractice policy
controversies.81 Conceding that the insurance policy did not contain
See Vaeth, supra note 1, at 255.
157 N.W.2d 870 (Neb. 1968).
75 See id. at 871. By mistake, the plaintiffs employee-technician poured
benzine
into a sterilizer instead of water, resulting in a fire that caused extensive damage to
the offices. See id. The court determined that the malpractice carrier was not liable
for the fire damage caused by the employee's negligence because the act of
negligently refilling the sterilizer did not constitute "professional services." See id. at
872.
76 See id. at 871-72; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing
judicial
interpretations of "professional services").
77 See Marx, 157 N.W.2d at
871.
78 Id. at 871-72.
7
Id. at 872.
80
See Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 76 N.J. 477, 484, 388 A.2d 603, 606 (1978).
81 See, e.g., Princeton Ins. Co. v. Chunmuang, 151 N.J. 80, 94, 698 A.2d 9, 16
(1997); Assembly 1998, 208th Leg., (N.J. 1998) (proposed bill and summary
75
74
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an exclusionary provision for intentional acts, the insurer in
Ambassador argued that public policy prohibited indemnification for
the civil consequences of the insured's intentional acts. 8 2 The court
acknowledged that deterrence flowing from financial liability for
one's own intentional wrongdoing would be lacking if a person were
able to insure against these economic consequences.3 The court also
recognized "the general principle that an insurer may not contract to
indemnify an insured against the civil consequences of his own willful
criminal act.8'

4

However, the majority in Ambassador concluded that

this general principle should not be applied in circumstances in
which the wrongdoer does not receive a benefit and the innocent
victim is afforded the remedy provided by the insurance policy.8

5

To

satisfy these conditions, the court maintained that equity would allow
the insurer to be indemnified by its insured wrongdoer for any
payment made to the victim.8

6

The court explained that public policy

would be served by forcing the wrongdoer ultimately to satisfy the
financial obligation while furthering the public interest in
compensating innocent victims."'
The dissent in Ambassador vehemently disagreed with the
majority's approachss Dissenting, Justice Clifford opined that the
court disregarded both long-established public policy considerations
and specific policy provisions. 9 The justice explained that this
created a mechanism to reach the "deep pockets" and, in doing so,
forced other law-abiding insured individuals to shoulder the losses
caused by another's criminal act simply because the wrongdoer also
statement).
The insured wrongdoer in
82 See Ambassador, 76 N.J. at 482, 388 A.2d at 606.
Ambassador was convicted of arson for intentionally burning down one of his own
tenements, with four lives lost in the process. See id. at 480, 388 A.2d at 604-05. The
court also noted, notwithstanding public policy concerns, that the meaning of the
word "occurrence" in the policy's coverage provision "includes the happening or
taking place of an incident and is not restricted to accidental events." Id. at 482 n.2,
388 A.2d at 606 n.2.
83 See id. at 483, 388 A.2d at 606.
84

Id.

85

See id. The court determined that, so long as the benefit does not inure to the

insured wrongdoer, payment should be made by the insurer to the innocent third
party even if that person's damages were attributable to criminal conduct. See id. at
484, 388 A.2d at 606.
86 See id. The insurer would be reimbursed
by the insured for its payment of the
insured's debt to the injured party. See id. The court likened this subrogation to the
equitable creation of a constructive trust. See id. at 485, 388 A.2d at 607.
87 See id. at 484, 388
A.2d at 606-07.
a See Ambassador, 76 N.J. at 492-98, 388 A.2d at 611-14 (Clifford, J.,dissenting).
89 See id. at 492, 388 A.2d at 611 (CliffordJ, dissenting).
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decided to carry liability insurance.9" The justice also stressed that it
would violate long-recognized New Jersey public policy to indemnify
an insured for a loss resulting from an intentional criminal act, even
when proceeds would be paid to the innocent victims of the insured's
conduct. 9
92
The 1981 case of Public Service Mutual Insurance Co. v. Goldfarb
presented a unique situation concerning contract interpretation in a
suit based on allegations of sexual abuse during the course of dental
Recognizing that the professional liability policy
treatment. 93
provided coverage for injuries occurring during the course of
professional services and resulting from malpractice, error,
negligence, mistake, slander, libel, assault, or undue familiarity, the
court found that the insurer had a duty to defend the dentist against
claims of sexual abuse by a former patient. 94 The court concluded
that the policy language indicated an intent by the insurer to pay
compensatory damages caused by the unlawful conduct and, as long
as there was no finding of an intent to injure, the insurer would be
See id. Justice Clifford maintained that the policy in question did not, on its
face, provide coverage because the policy's coverage provision defined "occurrence"
as "'an accident ... which results in bodily injury or property damage neither
expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured ... ' Id. at 493, 388 A.2d
at 611-12 (Clifford, J., dissenting) (alterations in original). Applying the definition
of "intend" from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1965) to the insured's
actions, the dissent had little doubt that the bodily injury seen in this case was
intended (i.e., not an accident). See id. at 494, 388 A.2d at 612 (Clifford, J.,
dissenting). The word "intend" denotes a desire to cause the consequences of an act
or a belief that the consequences are substantially certain to occur. See id. While
noting that the policy was devoid of an express intentional acts exclusion, the justice
posited that there was an implied exclusion based "on the expectancies of the parties
to the insurance contract" and that the insurer's basis for non-liability is "implicit in
the nature of the agreement and the circumstances to which it applies." Id. at 49496, 388 A.2d at 612-13 (Clifford, J., dissenting). Justice Clifford further suggested
that the majority's approach appeared to permit coverage for punitive damages, a
consideration clearly beyond the expectations of the parties. See id. at 496, 388 A.2d
at 613 (Clifford,J., dissenting).
91 See id. at 498, 388 A.2d at 614 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
The dissent
distinguished the case at bar from the cases cited by the majority by pointing out
that, in the cases relied on by the majority, the parties receiving the insurance
proceeds were express beneficiaries of the fire insurance policies issued to them. See
id. at 497, 388 A.2d at 613 (Clifford, J., dissenting). Agreeing that there was no
public policy reason in those cases to deny insurance protection to the innocent
insured for the intentional acts of third party wrongdoers, the dissent emphasized
that the Ambassador case involved paying insurance proceeds to an innocent third
party from a policy issued to the insured wrongdoer. See id., 388 A.2d at 613-14
(Clifford,J., dissenting).
425 N.E.2d 810 (N.Y. 1981).
93 See id. at 812.
94 Seeid. at 813.
90
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held to the bargain struck and be required to indemnify the dentist
for his volitional acts. 95
Since its decision in 1984, Hirst v. St. PaulFire & MarineInsurance
Co. 96 has often been cited by courts as standing for the principle that

sexual abuse of patients by health-care providers outside of the
mental health area does not constitute a part of "professional
services" rendered and, thus, is not covered under these provisions of
professional liability policies. 97 Even though the physician in Hirst,
without medical justification, administered tranquilizers to the
patient to increase his susceptibility to the doctor's sexual advances,
the court found no evidence that the physician's treatment of a hand
injury was negligent or that the patient was harmed in any way by use
of the drugs. 9 The court determined that the cause of action
amounted to one in tort for sexual molestation, and not medical
malpractice. 99 Noting that there must be a causal relationship
between the professional treatment rendered and the injuries alleged
by the malpractice plaintiff, the court announced that " [t] he scope of
'professional services' does not include all forms of a doctor's
conduct simply because he is a doctor."' ° Accordingly, the court held
that coverage was unavailable under the policy for damages resulting
from the physician's misconduct. 10 1
See id. at 814-15. The court stated that, despite the fact that the dentist was
convicted of sexual abuse in the third degree, public policy did not preclude
insurance coverage for his civil liability as long as the intentional act caused
unintended injury. See id. at 814. Because punitive damages imply intentional
wrongdoing, insurers cannot be compelled to indemnify for punitive damages. See
id.
683 P.2d 440 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984).
97 See Vaeth, supra note 1, at 256. The facts in Hirst
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co. demonstrated that the physician performed an initial consultation on
the patient for a wrestling injury to a finger and thumb of one hand. See Hirst, 683
P.2d at 442. Upon a return visit, the physician drugged the patient and proceeded to
perform sexual acts on the patient against his will. See id. The physician repeated
these activities on subsequent appointments in his office and at the patient's home.
See id.
98 See Hirst, 683 P.2d at 444.
99 See id.
100 Id. (referencing the definition of "professional services" in Marx v. Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co., 157 N.W.2d 870, 871-72 (Neb. 1968)); see also supra note 2
and accompanying text (quoting Marx definition of professional services).
101 See Hirst, 683 P.2d at 448. The court also held that the insurer had a duty to
defend the physician because the complaint alleged various acts of negligence and
malpractice which, if established, would bring the cause of action within the policy's
coverage provision. See id. at 445. Doubt as to the duty to defend is "resolved in
favor of the insured" and such duty continues "until such time as the claim against
the insured is confined to a recovery that the policy does not cover." Id. at 445-46.
The obligation to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify. See id. at 446.
95
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Standlee v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.'02 involved the
03
In Standlee, however, there
same physician and policy as in Hirst.1
were no claims that drugs were used to further the misconduct, and
the sexual molestation occurred in a hospital setting rather than in
the doctor's office or the patient's home.' 4 The court found that
coverage depends on the nature of the physician's conduct and not
on his title or the location of the act. 10 5 The court concluded that
under its "professional services" provision, the policy did not provide
liability coverage for sexual assault.1°6
The appellate division in Chunmuang relied primarily upon
0 7
Asbuty, a case often cited with disapproval in other jurisdictions.
Asbuty involved a gynecologist who was accused of manipulating the
clitorises of four separate women in the course of routine gynecologic
Finding that the claims were within the "providing
examinations."'
professional services" language of the policy, the
of
or withholding
court held that the tortious conduct, if true, occurred while the
accused was providing professional services, and that the conduct was
an "intertwined and inseparable" part of those services.' ° Citing cases
involving psychotherapist sexual misconduct with patients, the Asbuiy
court stated that the patients' injuries arose during the course of
professional treatment services and were made possible only because
of those services." ° The court further held that Arizona public policy
"favors protecting the interests of injured parties.""'
102 693 P.2d 1101 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984).

0s Seeid. at 1102.
See id.
105 See id. The court also noted that it was not relevant that the allegations in
104

Standlee did not include the doctor's use of drugs to further the sexual advances. See
id.
106 See id.
107 See Princeton Ins. Co. v. Chunmuang, 292 N.J. Super. 349, 355, 678 A.2d
1143,
1146 (App. Div. 1996); Vaeth, supra note 1, at 256.
108 See Asbury, 720 P.2d at 54142.
109 See id. at 541-42. The court explained that the issue of coverage for alleged
damages resulting from the provision of professional services does not depend on
whether the alleged conduct was intentional or negligent, but instead turns on
whether the conduct occurred during treatment of patients. See id. at 541. In
deciding that the patients' claims fell within the policy language, the court also noted
that the policy contained no applicable exclusion clauses. See id.
"o See id. at 542 (citing Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Kambly, 319 N.W.2d 382 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1982). The court in Asbury went on to distinguish its case from Hirst v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 683 P.2d 440 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984). See Asbury, 720 P.2d
at 542. The Asbury court opined that the sexual abuse in Hirst was not related to the
treatment of a hand injury and, thus, was not "intertwined with and inseparable
from" the services provided. See id.; see also Florig, supra note 1, at 722. Florig finds
fault in the decisions that find coverage for sexual abuse by health-care providers and
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In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Malec,"2 decided in 1986, the New
Jersey Supreme Court further delineated and resolved a number of
issues relating to insurance indemnification of intentional
wrongdoing in the context of automobile insurance.'1 3 The insurer
invoked its standard policy provision excluding coverage for bodily
injury or property damage caused by the intentional acts of the
insured and denied financial responsibility for the injuries suffered
by a third party." 4 The court concluded that New Jersey's no-fault
automobile legislation was not intended to overhaul the state's system
of liability insurance or to statutorily require carriers to indemnify5
acts."
their insureds for damages caused by their own intentional
characterizes their reasoning as a simple "but for" test: "Because the assault occurred
during an otherwise proper and necessary medical procedure, the injury arose out of
the performance of that professional service." Id. at 727. Postulating that this test is
without bounds because all events are in some way interrelated, Florig maintains that
sexual assault cannot be considered part of a medical procedure. See id. at 727 &
n.162 (also quoting MICHAEL CRICHTON, JURASSIC PARK 74 (1990):

"A butterfly flaps

its wings in Peking, and weather in New York is different.") Because sexual assault of
a patient is known to be harmful, and because the physician knows it furthers no
beneficial interest of the patient, it cannot be considered part of the contract for
professional services between a physician and patient. See id. at 727.
II St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Asbury, 720 P.2d 540, 542 (Ariz. Ct. App.
In support of this public policy position favoring protecting innocent
1986).
person's interests, the court refers to Vigilant Insurance Co. v. Kambly, which states, in
pertinent part:
[T]he public policy considerations.., which prohibit the insurability
of criminal or intentionally tortious conduct are not present here.
Initially, it is unlikely that the insured was induced to engage in the
unlawful conduct by reliance upon the insurability of any claims arising
therefrom or that allowing insurance coverage here would induce
future similar unlawful conduct by practitioners. Nor does it appear
that the policy was obtained in contemplation of a violation of the law.
Furthermore, coverage does not allow the wrongdoer unjustly to
benefit from his wrong. It is not the insured who will benefit, but the
innocent victim who will be provided compensation for her injuries ...
. In this instance, there is great public interest in protecting the
interests of the injured party.
Kambly, 319 N.W.2d at 385.
:
104 N.J. 1, 514A.2d 832 (1986).
3 See generally id. In a declaratory judgment action, Allstate Insurance
Company
sought a determination that its standard automobile liability insurance policy did not
cover its insured for damages sustained byJohn F. Malec, a police officer injured in a
collision with the insured in the context of a police chase. See id. at 3-5, 514 A.2d at
832-34. The insured was arrested for driving while unlicensed and for aggravated
assault of a police officer. See id. at 5, 514 A.2d at 834.
114 See id.
15 See id. at 8-10, 514 A.2d at 836-37.
Commencing the analysis, the court
outlined four basic principles applicable to the current case:
(1) Whenever an insurance policy and a governing statute are in
conflict, the statute controls, and the policy is automatically amended
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Therefore, finding no conflict between state statutes and the policy
provisions, the court held that the exclusion clause for intentional
valid.' 1 6
wrongful acts was consistent with public policy and thus
In Washington InsuranceGuarantyAss'n v. Hicks,"7 the Washington
Court of Appeals decided a case involving a chiropractor who had
sexual intercourse with a patient during a treatment session and
whose professional liability insurance policy provided coverage for a
"medical incident.".. The court stated that insurance policies should
not be interpreted in terms of isolated phrases, but instead should be
examined as a whole." 9 The court determined that the "any act or
omission" phrase in the definition of medical incident was modified
by the language "'in the furnishing of professional . . . services"'
20
The court concluded that the sexual acts of the
following it.1

chiropractor were not related to the furnishing of professional
(2)
by operation of law to conform to the statutory standard.
Legislation involving automobile insurance must be construed with
"liberality in effecting the broadest protection of auto accident victims.
.. " (3) Statutorily mandated coverage cannot be countered by policy
provisions that are contrary to the statutory mandates or public policy.
(4) Policy provisions that exclude coverage for liability resulting from
intentional wrongful acts are "common," are "accepted as valid
limitations," and are consistent with public policy.
Id. at 6, 514 A.2d at 834-35 (citations omitted).
116 See id. at 10-12, 514 A.2d at 837. The court noted that "all or
virtually all" of the
automobile liability policies written in NewJersey contain intentional acts exclusions
applicable to the insured's conduct. See id. at 11, 514 A.2d at 837. The court further
stated that the holding in Ambassadorwas not applicable in a case such as this one in
which the policy contained a specific intentional acts exclusion. See id. at 12, 514
A.2d at 838. Emphasizing that "Ambassadorwas decided by a divided Court," Justice
Clifford, writing for a unanimous court in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Malec, stated: "The
Court is therefore not of one mind on the broad policy question of whether, in the
absence of a specific exclusion, a liability insurer can nevertheless be called on to
indemnify a wrongdoer for his intentional misconduct that results in liability to an
innocent third party." Id. The Malec court decided to read Ambassador narrowly and
to limit the decision to the specific situation presented. See id. at 13, 514 A.2d at 838.
117 744 P.2d 625 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1987).
118 See id. at 626. The relevant policy language, almost identical
to that found in
the policy in Chunmuang,states, in pertinent part:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured: All sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages ...

caused by

a medical incident ... in the practice of the insured's profession ....
"[M]edical incident" means any act or omission in the furnishing of
professional medical or dental services ....

Any such act or omission

together with all related acts or omissions in the furnishing of such
services to any one person shall be considered one medical incident.
Id., 744 P.2d at 626; see also supra note 62 (discussing insurance policy in
Chunmuang).
"9
See Hicks, 744 P.2d at 627.
12
Id. (alteration in original).
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services and, therefore, did not constitute a covered medical
incident."' This interpretation of available coverage under the term
"medical incident" is contrary to the court's finding in Chunmuang, in
which, but for the criminal acts exclusion, indemnification would
have been found under similar language.'2 Finding no coverage
under the terms of the policy, the Hicks court chose not to address
the significance of the exclusion clause or the public policy issues.'2 '
By contrast, the 1990 decision in St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Co. v. Love represents a classic case in which harm resulting from
sexual contact between a mental health professional and a patient
would be covered under a professional liability policy.12 5 The court

recounted that the patient sought professional services to treat an
emotional and sexual problem and noted that the patient's harm,
allegedly made worse. by the therapist's sexual misconduct, was
related to those very problems.2 6 The court reported that when
sexual relations occur in this setting, they are "inextricably related to
the dynamics of the therapeutic relationship"'27 and may be
considered a failure to provide proper professional services. 28 The
court did, however, suggest that a malpractice carrier could limit its
financial exposure for harm resulting from its insured's mishandling
of the transference phenomenon through exclusion provisions.'l
In 1996, with the decision in Records v. Aetna Life & Casualty
Insurance,'"° the NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, added
121

See id. The court noted that, although malpractice coverage has been afforded

for psychotherapists who mishandle the transference phenomenon by engaging in
sexual contact with patients, courts generally hold that, in other contexts, such
policies do not cover such conduct. See id.
122 See Princeton Ins. Co. v. Chunmuang, 151 N.J. 80, 98, 698 A.2d 9, 18 (1997).
See Hicks, 744 P.2d at 627-28.
1
124 459 N.W.2d 698 (Minn. 1990).
125 See id. at 702 (finding that mishandling of the transference
phenomenon could

constitute negligent performance of professional services affording coverage under a
malpractice policy).
I See id. at 701.
127

Id. at 702.

See id. (characterizing the mishandling of the transference phenomenon as a
failure to provide proper professional treatment); see also Florig, supra note 1, at 731.
1

Florig writes that decisions granting coverage to health-care providers for sexual
misconduct based on the logic that the harm realized arose out of the rendering of
professional services are flawed. See id. Scholars write that merely because the
therapist-patient relationship began as a professional encounter does not mean it

continued as such once the sexual molestation commenced. See id.Sexual assault is
a harmful, intentional, and unconsented act and hardly could be considered a
professional service of the psychotherapist. See id.
1
See Love, 459 N.W.2d at 702.
ISO 294 N.J. Super 463, 683 A.2d 834 (App. Div. 1996).
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a new dimension to medical malpractice liability determinations by
formulating a "substantial nexus" test) 3 ' This case addressed the
scope of a medical malpractice policy as applied to a physical assault
committed by a physician on a nurse during a disagreement over a
patient transfer decision. 32 The court observed that the policy
provided coverage for claims "arising out of the rendering of or
failure to render . . . professional services, "3 and not just claims

involving the direct performance of these services.134 The court
observed that the term "arising out of' included conduct "originating
from, growing out of[,] or having a substantial nexus"'35 with a
covered activity. 36 Finally, the court found that the physician-nurse
discussion regarding the patient transfer arose out of the rendering
of professional services, and that the physical assault3 7that occurred
during the course of that discussion was a covered act.
Against this foundation of case law, the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Chunmuang settled the issue of whether, in New Jersey, a
criminal acts exclusion clause in a professional liability insurance
policy requires the insurer to pay compensatory damages to the
victim of a physician's sexual assault committed during a gynecologic
examination. 3 8 In resolving this issue, the court also addressed the
question of basic coverage for such 9acts under the policy's indemnity
provision for a "medical incident. ,13

Writing for the majority,'4 Justice Stein commenced the analysis
by noting that, because New Jersey law does not require physicians to

131 See id. at 468, 683 A.2d at 837.

See id. at 465, 683 A.2d at 835. The physician's medical malpractice policy
provided coverage for "'injury arising out of the rendering of or failure to render...
professional services"' and further defined "professional services" to be "'services
requiring specialized knowledge and mental skill in the practice of the profession.'"
Id. at 467, 683 A.2d at 836 (quoting the medical malpractice policy language at issue)
(alteration in original). The court noted that insurance policies should afford the
broadest protection, consistent with the reasonable expectations of the insured. See
id. (citing Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 100 N.J. 325, 337, 495 A.2d 406, 413 (1985)).
13
Records, 294 N.J. Super. at 467, 683 A.2d at 836 (alteration in original).
132

134

See id.

Id. at 468, 683 A.2d at 837 (internal quotes omitted).
13
See id.
137 See id. at 470, 471,
683 A.2d at 838.
138 See Princeton Ins. Co. v. Chunmuang, 151 N.J.
80, 82, 698 A.2d 9, 10 (1997).
l3 See id. at 87, 698 A.2d at 12.
140 See id. at 101, 698 A.2d at 19 ("Chief Justice Poritz
and Justices Pollock and
Garibaldi join[ed] in Justice Stein's opinion[;]" Justice O'Hern filed a separate
concurrence, and Justice Handler filed a "separate dissenting opinion, in which
1

Justice Coleman join [ed].").
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the scope of coverage
maintain medical malpractice insurance,
determinations for medical malpractice insurance policies becomes
an exercise in contract interpretation. 142 The justice recounted that
insurance policies are typically interpreted according to the parties'
reasonable expectations, and that ambiguities are usually resolved in
the insured's favor. 43 The court further recognized that, in other
jurisdictions, the majority rule precludes liability insurance coverage
for patient injuries originating from the sexual misconduct of healthcare professionals other than mental health-care providers.'"
Embarking on a comprehensive survey of prior case law, Justice
Stein observed that Hirst was the most frequently cited case
Hirst emphasized the absence of a
supporting the majority rule.
causal relationship between the injury sustained by the claimant and
the expected treatment.1 The majority opined that Hirst relied on a
141

See id. at 87, 698 A.2d at 12 (citing NJ.

STAT. ANN. §

17:30D-1 to 17 (West 1998)

(relating to medical malpractice insurance); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-1 to 27 (West
1998) (relating to regulated professions and occupations); and NJ. STAT. ANN. §
45:9-1 to 58 (West 1998) (relating to medicine and surgery)).
142 See id.; see also supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text
(discussing Malec).
Interestingly, subsequent to the court's decision in Chunmuang, the New Jersey
Legislature in 1998 enacted title 45, section 9-19.17 of the New Jersey Statutes and
title 45, section 5-5.3 of the New Jersey Statutes requiring physicians and podiatrists,
respectively, to maintain medical malpractice liability insurance coverage or,
alternatively, a letter of credit as security against malpractice awards if such insurance
See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing
coverage is unavailable.
legislative intent and the uncertain effect of these bills on future litigation of the
coverage and exclusion issues raised in cases like Chunmuang). Previously, the
Legislature, in supporting a policy of medical malpractice coverage, established a
reinsurance fund and enacted other statutory provisions to ensure the availability of
malpractice insurance. See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 87 n.1, 698 A.2d at 12 n.l.
See Chunmuang, 151 NJ. at 87-88, 698 A.2d at 12 (citing Voorhees v. Preferred
Mut. Ins. Co., 128 N.J. 165, 175, 607 A.2d 1255 (1992) and Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co.,
100 NJ. 325, 334-39, 495 A.2d 406, 412-14 (1985)) In Voorhees, the court explained:
Generally, an insurance policy should be interpreted according to its
plain and ordinary meaning. But because insurance policies are
adhesion contracts, courts must assume a particularly vigilant role in
ensuring their conformity to public policy and principles of fairness.
When the meaning of a phrase is ambiguous, the ambiguity is resolved
in favor of the insured . . . and in line with an insured's objectivelyMoreover, if an insured's "reasonable
reasonable expectations.
expectations" contravene the plain meaning of a policy, even its plain
meaning can be overcome. Nonetheless, courts "'should not write for
the insured a better policy of insurance than the one purchased."'
Voorhees, 128 NJ. 165, 175, 607 A.2d 1255, 1260 (1992) (citations omitted).
1
See Chunmuang, 151 NJ. at 88, 698 A.2d at 12-13 (acknowledging the majority
rule in cases dealing with policy provisions substantially similar to those in
Chunmuang's policy).
145 See id., 698 A.2d at
13.
146 See id.; see also supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text (discussing
the facts
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restrictive definition of "professional services" to endorse a narrow
test for policy coverage and followed the reasoning in Marx in
support of that definition.
Justice Stein, by referencing the approach taken in Asbury and
adopted by a minority of courts, discussed an exception to the
general rule prohibiting insurance coverage for physicians' sexual
assaults on patients.1 48 As with the claim against Chunmuang, the
justice noted that Asbury also involved allegations of a gynecologist
sexually assaulting patients during examinations.1 4 9 Justice Stein
explained that Asbury accepted the general rule and analysis of Marx
and Hirst but, more significantly, emphasized that the sexual contact
in those cases was unrelated to the treatment sought.'5 0 The justice
reported that Asbury found coverage for the injuries sustained by
determining that the sexual assault was "intertwined with and
inseparable from" the performance of professional services.15' The
majority observed, however, that Asbury relied on cases involving the
sexual misconduct of psychiatrists in announcing this "intertwined
and inseparable" exception to the general rule of coverage denial. 52
and court analysis in Hirst). The Hirst court found that, because the physician did
not negligently treat the patient's injuries nor cause him harm from the
administration of drugs, the claim amounted to a tort action for sexual molestation
and was not covered under the malpractice policy. See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 88-89,
698 A.2d at 13.
147 See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 89, 698
A.2d at 13; see also supra note 2 and
accompanying text (discussing the definition of "professional services" articulated in
Marx).
1
See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 89, 698 A.2d at 13-14.
149
See id. at 89-90, 698 A.2d at 14.
150
See id. at 90, 698 A.2d at 14.
151
See id at 89, 698 A.2d at 13-14. The court noted that the Asbury policy did not
contain applicable exclusion provisions. See id. at 90, 698 A.2d at 14. The court also
discussed St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Shernow, 610 A.2d 1281 (Conn. 1992).
See id. Shernow involved a dentist who sexually assaulted a patient after administering
excessive amounts of nitrous oxide that also resulted in physical injury from the
aspiration of stomach acid into the patient's lungs. See Shernow, 610 A.2d at 1283. In
adopting the "intertwined and inseparable" rule, Shernow distinguished Hirst by
stating, "unlike Hirst [in which the assault was not closely related to treatment
sought], the jury here heard evidence of specific acts of professional negligence,
some of which had occurred prior to the sexual encounter." Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at
90, 698 A.2d at 14 (quoting Shernow, 610 A.2d at 1284). Further, the Shernow court
held that "[w]hen the medically negligent procedure is so inextricably intertwined
and inseparable from the intentional conduct that serves as the basis for the separate
claim of a sexual assault ...

professional liability policies must ...

extend coverage."

Shernow, 610 A.2d at 1285. Because the patient's harm was caused not only by the
sexual assault, but also by the drugs administered, the coverage found in Shernow
rests on different grounds than those found in Asbury. See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 90,
698 A.2d at 14.
152
See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 90, 698 A.2d at 14. The court recognized the
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The court explained that cases involving psychotherapists are
distinguishable from those implicating other physicians because
sexual contact is arguably consented to in the mental health context,
and mishandling of the transference phenomenon constitutes
malpractice.'" The justice reported, however, that the majority of
courts that have considered sexual assaults by physicians in cases
factually similar to Asbury have declined to follow its "intertwined and
coverage under policy provisions
inseparable" approach for finding
54
defining professional services.

general rule holding malpractice carriers liable for claims based on sexual contact
between patients and psychotherapists. See id. at 91, 698 A.2d at 14.
153
See id. at 91, 698 A.2d at 14; see also supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text
(discussing transference phenomenon and majority rule that mishandling of this
integral part of psychotherapy constitutes malpractice).
See id., 698 A.2d at 14-15; see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cromeans,
771 F. Supp. 349 (N.D. Ala. 1991) (cited by Chunmuang,151 N.J. at 91-92, 698 A.2d at
15). In holding that a malpractice carrier was not liable to defend or indemnify a
physician who sexually abused two minor females, the court in Cromeans criticized
Asbuiy for both its "intertwined and inseparable" test as well as its reliance on the
psychotherapy cases. See Cromeans, 771 F. Supp. at 351-54. Cromeans determined that
the acts complained of did not constitute "professional services" and cited the
reasoning in Hirst and Marx as support for this position. See id. at 352-53. The court
posited that the acts complained of were acts that a layperson, lacking in medical
training, could accomplish, and that they occurred between a physician and patient
was relevant "only if the act itself [was] of a professional nature." See id. at 353. The
court went on to state:
Every case that has considered this issue has determined that sexual
abuse does not constitute the rendering ... of "professional services,"
except ... Asbury .... [T]he Asbury case relies exclusively on the cases

in which a psychiatrist or psychologist failed to properly handle the
"transference phenomenon," a medically recognized condition.
[T]he Asbuiy case is a poorly reasoned decision in that it held that
massaging a woman's clitoris was intertwined with and inseparable
The Asbury court apparently
from a gynecological examination.
attempts to distinguish Hirst (and its progeny) by the location of the
various parts of the anatomy.
[T]he Asbuiy court seems to be saying that if the physician is
treating a sexual part of the patient's body ...

and commits sexual

abuse by improperly manipulating or stroking the patient in the same
general area, it is thus "intertwined" with treatment and ipso facto
there is insurance coverage ....[T] his "Asbury" reasoning is illogical.
Id. In addition, the court concluded that policy provisions insuring against losses
resulting from intentional, fraudulent, immoral, or felonious conduct are "void as
against public policy." Id. at 352. The Cromeans court also held that the parties to the
contract intended that the policy cover injuries "negligently or wantonly caused while
medically treating ...a patient for a medical ill but not for intentional actions taken
by the insured doctor directed ... towards the patient to satisfy the doctor's sexual
lust or to otherwise further his own prurient interests." Id. The court found sexual
abuse was simply not within the parties' contemplation regarding liability coverage.
See id.
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The majority proceeded to discuss the opinion in Snyder v.
55
Major,1
a federal case that also declined to follow the "intertwined
and inseparable" exception espoused by Asbuy.'56 Justice Stein stated
that the Snyder court rejected Asbuty's approach because (a) the
exception did not reflect the parties' expectations; (b) there was no
logical basis for the distinction between assaults occurring during
erogenous zone examinations and assaults associated with other
physical examinations; and (c) the exception's boundaries were
undefined. 57
The majority in Chunmuang acknowledged that New Jersey
courts had not previously addressed the issue of medical malpractice
insurance coverage for sexual assaults committed upon patients by
their physicians. '9 The court pointed out, however, that the
appellate division in Records decided a malpractice insurance case
involving a physician assault on a nurse.'5 9 In concluding that the
appellate division focused on the policy term "arising out of' instead
of the definition of "professional services," Justice Stein noted that
the nurse's claim fell within the policy's coverage provisions.' 60 The

789 F. Supp. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
See Chunmuang,151 N.J. at 92, 698 A.2d at 15.
157 See id. In Snyder v. Major, a plastic
surgeon sedated a patient prior to
performing a procedure involving manipulation of the breasts to reduce hardness
associated with breast implants. See Snyder, 789 F. Supp. at 647. The surgeon then
had sexual intercourse with the patient while she was at least partially sedated. See id.
The Snyder court affirmed the prevailing view that sexual misconduct does not
constitute a medical incident under malpractice policy provisions unless the doctor is
a psychiatrist and the conduct arises out of a psychoanalytic relationship. See id. at
649. The court further noted that there appears to be no satisfactory reason to treat
psychiatrists' sexual misconduct any differently than that of other physicians. See id.
While criticizing Asbury, the court rejected the plaintiff's suggestion that sexual
assault constitutes a covered medical incident if "it arises out of psychiatric treatment
or ...treatment of the erogenous zones." Id. at 650. Snyder further stated that the
question was not whether the act was negligent, but whether the policy was intended
to cover the act. See id. With the exception of Asbuy, case law informs physicians
that sexual misconduct by psychiatrists is covered by professional-liability policies,
while that of other doctors is not. See id. The opinion emphasized that "courts must.
be especially vigilant in guarding against the inclination to expand the liability
insurer's cost and thereby raise the cost of health care to the consumer." Id. at 650
n.3. In refusing to adopt an unworkable rule with amorphous boundaries, the court
opined that the subjectivity of the term "erogenous zone" would lead to additional
legal disputes. See id. at 650. The court, skeptical of the suggestion that "a
physician's duty to refrain from sexually abusing his (or her) patients is any greater
in cases where the physician is treating the erogenous zones," refused to recognize
the exceptions proposed by the party seeking to establish coverage. Id.
5
See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 93, 698 A.2d at 15.
159 See id.; see also supranotes 130-137 (discussing
the facts and analysis in Records).
16
See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 93, 698A.2d at 16.
:55
56
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justice recounted the appellate division's finding that the term
"arising out of' has been broadly construed in other cases "to mean
conduct 'originating from,' 'growing out of[,]' or having 6a
'substantial nexus' with the activity for which coverage is provided.',
Recognizing that a "substantial nexus" test is broader than the
coverage criteria used in Marx and its progeny, Justice Stein quoted
the appellate division in Records, which stated that "conduct which has
a substantial nexus to an insured activity may be found to 'arise out
of' that activity even if it is unlawful."' 62
The justice next turned to public policy considerations by
mentioning that other states that apply a restrictive test to deny
coverage for sexual assaults emphasize that wrongdoers should not be
able to insure themselves against their own intentional acts. 63 The
majority reported that the NewJersey Supreme Court has recognized
this position, as well as the competing public policy argument
advocating compensation for innocent victims. '6 The court cited
Ambassador and concluded that the compensation of victims for
injuries resulting from an insured's criminal acts are not to be
construed as an implicit tolerance of unlawful conduct in situations
in which the payment does not inure to the benefit of the insured
wrongdoer. 5
The court next discussed exclusion provisions in insurance
policies and determined that, although such exclusions are narrowly
construed, they are presumptively valid if unambiguous and
consistent with public policy.'6 Justice Stein explained that, although
intentional acts exclusions are sometimes narrowly construed because
of the subjective nature of intent, the application of criminal acts
exclusions depends on an objective standard. 167
The justice
instructed that proof of a criminal conviction is usually sufficient to
Id. (citations omitted). The appellate division postulated that if the doctor
negligently stepped on the nurse's toe in the midst of a discussion over patient
disposition, the resulting injury would have a "substantial nexus" to the physician's
rendering of professional services and would thus be covered. See Records, 294 N.J.
Su er. at 468, 683 A.2d at 837.
Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 94, 698 A.2d at 16 (quoting Records, 294 N.J. Super. at
469, 683 A.2d at 837).
161

163

164

See id.

See id.
See id. at 94-95, 698 A.2d at 16; see also supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text
(discussing the court's analysis in Ambassador).
16 See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 95, 698 A.2d at 16-17 (citing Doto v. Russo, 140
N.J.
544, 559, 659 A.2d 1371, 1378 (1995)).
167 See id., 698 A.2d at 17.
Regarding intentional acts exclusions, criminal
convictions are evidence of intent but are not conclusive proof of such intent. See id.
165
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allow application of the criminal acts exclusion to the conduct in
question.' The court also discussed the significance of the holding
in Malec, an automobile insurance case, decided after Ambassador.i
The court in Malec stated that specific intentional acts exclusions do
not violate public policy and should be enforced. 70 Justice Stein
further determined that courts in other jurisdictions have upheld
criminal, intentional,
or sexual misconduct exclusions in professional
7
liability policies.

1

Following the court's review and interpretation of the relevant
case law, the majority commenced an analysis of the policy language
at issue in Chunmuang 72 The court concluded that the policy
provision - specifying coverage for injuries that resulted from a
"medical incident" - did not limit coverage only to harm caused by

See id. at 96, 698 A.2d at 17.
See id.
170 See id. The Malec court found that intentional
acts exclusions are "'common,'
are 'accepted as valid limitations,' and are consistent with public policy."
Id.
(quoting Malec, 104 N.J. 1, 6, 514 A.2d 832, 834-35 (1986)); see also NewJersey Mfrs.
Ins. Co. v. Brower, 161 N.J. Super. 293, 300, 391 A.2d 923, 927 (App. Div. 1978)
(cited by Chunmuangand finding Ambassador not controlling in a case in which policy
contained an express intentional acts exclusion).
171 See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 96, 698 A.2d at 17; see, e.g., Rivera
v. Nevada Med.
Liab. Ins. Co., 814 P.2d 71, 72-74 (Nev. 1991) (discussed by Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at
96-97, 698 A.2d at 17-18). In Rivera, the court concluded that a claim based on an act
of sodomy resulting in a conviction for sexual assault and associated with the
performance of a gynecologic examination was properly denied coverage because of
a valid sexual acts exclusion in the policy. See id. at 72, 74. The court determined
that the exclusion provision did not apply only to tortious acts that were separate
from the professional services performed. See id. at 73. In fact, noting that the
insurer would not need to exclude from coverage separate acts of sexual assault
occurring outside the doctor's office, the court found that the policy exclusion
specifically referred to sexual misconduct arising out of professional services
rendered. See id. Furthermore, the court stated that, generally, insurers may limit
their liability and deter wrongful behavior by use of intentional acts exclusion
clauses. See id. at 74. "[E]ven though the basic idea behind insurance is to
compensate the injured, an insurance policy is nothing more than a contract
between the insured and the carrier." Id. at 74. The court determined that, if the
physician does not purchase coverage for the specific conduct at issue, the insurer is
not obligated to pay damages resulting from that conduct, even if an innocent victim
deserves compensation. See id. The court recognized that an insurance carrier may
exclude any specific acts from coverage not forbidden by state law. See id.
Explaining that insurers set premiums based on the scope of coverage provided, the
court concluded that the average law-abiding physician would not want to pay higher
premiums for indemnification of criminal acts or intentional misconduct. See id.
The court indicated that, in fact, health-care providers do not expect coverage for
such conduct. See id.
172 See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 97, 698 A.2d
at 18; see also supra note 62 and
accompanying text (discussing "medical incident" under coverage provisions).
168
169
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conduct that was considered "professional" in character. 73 Because
the policy itself suggested that coverage would be provided for any act
that arose during the rendering of professional services, Justice Stein
found it unnecessary to adopt the Asbury "intertwined and
inseparable" approach in the case at bar.174 By contrast, the court
majority applied the "substantial nexus" test announced in Records
and found that the criminal acts committed by Chunmuang
incident" as contemplated by the parties to the
constituted a "medical
75
insurance policy.

Although the court determined that Chunmuang's conduct
would fall within the scope of the policy's coverage provision as a
"medical incident," Justice Stein reminded the parties that the policy
••
176
The justice further stated that
contained a criminal acts exclusion.
are
not
contrary
to public policy, are not
such exclusion clauses
inconsistent with the purpose behind medical malpractice policies,
expectations of
are not in conflict with the probable intentions and
77
the parties to the contract, and, therefore, are valid.'
The majority distinguished Asbury, the case relied on by the
appellate division, from the circumstances of the present case.171
Justice Stein noted that the policy at issue in Asbury did not contain a
criminal acts exclusion and, thus, could not provide guidance in the
analysis of the exclusion provision in Chunmuang's policy.'79 The
court maintained that the Asbury reasoning would be relevant only in
determining whether Chunmuang's criminal conduct could be
173 See Chunmuang,151 N.J. at 97, 698 A.2d at
18. The court referred to the Marx
and Hirst definition of professional services. See id.; see also supra note 2 (quoting
Marx test for definition of "professional services").
174
See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 97, 698 A.2d at 18. The Asbuiy court determined
that sexual assault during a gynecologic examination is more "intertwined with" and
"inseparable from" the professional services rendered than is an assault committed in
association with other types of clinical evaluations. See id. at 98, 698 A.2d at 18.175
See id. at 97-98, 698 A.2d at 18; see also supra notes 130-137 and accompanying
text (discussing definition and application of "substantial nexus" test in Records). In
determining whether there was a substantial nexus between the professional services
sought and the circumstances in which the assault took place, the court stated that
the assault was possible "only because Davis entrusted herself to the physician's care
for the purpose of receiving diagnosis and treatment for a medical problem" and
that the assault occurred during what Chunmuang represented to be a legitimate
gynecological evaluation. Chunmuang,151 N.J. at 97-98, 698 A.2d at 18.
See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 98, 698 A.2d at 18.
177
See id. While acknowledging a public interest in providing compensation to
innocent victims of criminal acts, the court stressed that a professional-liability policy
is a contract, and that civil liability for criminal conduct is not typically a
consideration when purchasing such insurance. See id.
178 See id.
17
See id.
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construed as a professional service covered by the malpractice
policy.8 0 The justice did not rely on Asbury in determining whether
Chunmuang's conduct constituted acts of malpractice that otherwise
would be afforded liability coverage but for the exclusion clause.'
Suggesting that interpretation of a policy containing an exclusion
provision entails a different analysis than that required in the absence
of such a provision, Justice Stein opined that, for an exclusion to be
meaningful, "it must be interpreted to exclude something that would
otherwise be covered.'8 2 Finally, in upholding the validity of the
exclusion provision, the majority rejected the proposition of the
appellate division, which represented that application of the
exclusion clause was limited to circumstances in which there was no
connection between the criminal act and the professional services
sought.'83
The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that enforcement of
a criminal acts exclusion in a medical malpractice insurance policy
does not offend public policy and that coverage for claims based on
harm caused by criminal acts is properly denied under such

180

181

See id. at 98, 698 A.2d at 18.
See id. The court had already determined that Chunmuang's conduct would

be covered under the policy language defining "medical incident." See id.
182 Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 99, 698 A.2d at 18.
183 See id. The majority also criticized the dissent for relying on psychotherapist
malpractice cases in reaching the conclusion that criminal acts exclusions should be
ignored when the conduct in question is intertwined with malpractice. See id., 698
A.2d at 18-19 (citing L.L. v. Medical Protective Co., 362 N.W,2d 174, 177, 179 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1984)). Interestingly, the L.L. v. Medical Protective Co. court observed that "a
sexual relationship between therapist and patient cannot be viewed separately from
the therapeutic relationship that has developed between them." L.L., 362 N.W.2d at
174, 178 (1984). The court in L.L asserted that the malpractice component of
mishandling the transference phenomenon is inseparable from the related criminal
behavior because of the unique nature of the therapeutic relationship. See id. at 17879.
Justice Stein posited that the reasoning employed in the mental health area does
not apply to sexual misconduct committed by other categories of health-care
providers. See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 99, 698 A.2d at 19. The fact that a gynecologist
may have greater opportunity to "intertwine" sexual misconduct with legitimate
professional services is irrelevant to the applicability of a criminal acts exclusion,
because the harm caused by the sexual contact is significantly different from the
harm caused by other forms of noncriminal professional negligence. See id. at 99100, 698 A.2d at 19. In addition, the opportunity for gynecologist sexual misconduct
does not differ substantially from those opportunities available in other fields of
physician practice; therefore, criminal acts exclusions should generally be applicable
to physicians other than psychiatrists. See id. at 100, 698 A.2d at 19. The Author
notes that physicians, other than gynecologists (including family practitioners,
internists, general surgeons, and emergency medicine specialists), routinely perform
gynecologic examinations.
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provisions.1 84 Accordingly, the court reversed and held that Princeton
was not liable to Davis for compensatory damages resulting from the
criminal behavior of its insured physician.1
However, because no
evidence ascertaining damages from Chunmuang's acts of
professional negligence separate and distinct from those caused by
his criminal acts was presented at the proof hearing, the court
remanded the case to the6 law division to afford Davis the opportunity
to prove these damages.1

In a concurring opinionJustice O'Hern, while agreeing with the
opinion and judgment of the majority, specifically rejected the
dissent's view that it was unrealistic to expect a court to ascertain the87
source of the patient's injuries and apportion them accordingly.'
The concurrence was confident that a fact finder is capable of
assessing the injuries caused by Chunmuang's negligent deviation
from established medical standards."" Justice O'Hern further
elaborated that Davis was still entitled to full compensation from
Princeton for injuries sustained as a result of the physician's
negligent treatment of her condition, despite the criminal acts
exclusion.'8 9

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Handler, joined by Justice
Coleman, opined that the physician's sexual assault was "so
intertwined with his medical malpractice ... that it is not realistically
possible to identify, differentiate, and quantify the injuries
occasioned by the malpractice apart from the injuries attributable to
the sexual misconduct."' 9 Further, in acknowledging the appellate
184 See

Chunmuang,151 N.J. at 100, 698 A.2d at 19.
See id. Even though Davis argued that the criminal acts described in the
case
were inseparable from the acts of malpractice, and, because of this, Princeton should
185

have been compelled to compensate her for the judgment's entire amount, she also
contended that she suffered distinct injuries as a result of Chunmuang's negligent

failure to diagnose and treat her underlying medical condition. See id. Davis claimed
that a significant portion of the damage award was attributable to the medical

malpractice alone. See id.
I See id. at 100-01, 698 A.2d at 19. Davis had no apparent need to apportion her
damages at the time because a default judgment was entered against Chunmuang,
and Princeton decided not to provide the doctor with a defense. See id.
187 See id. at 101, 698 A.2d at 20 (O'Hern,J.,
concurring).
188 See id.
19 See
id.
190

Chunmuang, 151 NJ. at 102, 698 A.2d at 20 (Handler, J., dissenting).

The

dissent recognized that the majority opinion permitted the patient to recover

compensatory damages for the physician's negligent failure to provide proper
treatment for her underlying medical condition, separate from the damage caused
by the criminal act. See id. Justice Handler believed that any attempt to separate the
damages for the professional negligence from the damages for the criminal act
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division's reliance on the Asbury analysis and the majority's adoption
of the Records "substantial nexus" test, Justice Handler agreed with the
majority that Chunmuang's conduct fell within the scope of the
coverage provisions of his malpractice policy 9'
The dissent
recounted that the physician's criminal acts overlapped with his
performance of professional services and were inseparable from
them.' 92 The justice maintained, however, that the majority's
application of the criminal acts exclusion to the facts of the case
unfairly and unrealistically required the patient to prove damages
attributable to the physician's failure to properly diagnose and treat
her medical condition, distinct from those damages resulting from
the sexual assault. 19 Justice Handler argued that the coverage
exclusion language for harm "resulting from [the] performance of a
criminal act" excludes only that harm attributable solely to a separate
criminal 94 act having no relation to the expected professional
services.

In construing the application of the criminal acts exclusion in
Chunmuang's policy, the dissent agreed with the appellate division's
analogy to the psychotherapist cases involving mishandling of the
transference phenomenon.' 95 The justice elaborated that, as with
psychiatric treatment, patients' privacy, personal dignity, individual
integrity, and emotional well-being are all at risk during gynecologic
evaluations, thus rendering patients vulnerable to the improper
sexual advances of physicians.'9 Justice Handler concluded that the
would be arbitrary, artificial, and could unfairly eliminate the possibility of a recovery
for Davis. See id.
191 See id. at 103-04, 698 A.2d at 21 (Handler,
J., dissenting); see also supra notes
130-137 and accompanying text (discussing application of substantial nexus test);
supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (discussing appellate division's analysis and
application of Asbury's "intertwined and inseparable" approach).
?W See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 104, 698 A.2d at 21 (HandlerJ., dissenting).
193
See id. The dissent proffered that the patient suffered harm as a result of the
physician's failure to perform a proper gynecologic examination and that the acts of
malpractice also consisted of criminal behavior. See id.
194 Id. at 104-05, 698 A.2d at 21 (HandlerJ, dissenting). The dissent
agreed with
the appellate division in this regard. See id.
195 See id. at 105, 698 A.2d at 21-22 (Handler, J., dissenting).
The appellate
division declared that coverage for "a gynecologist's excessive examination of sexual
organs is on a firmer legal footing than the mental health professional coverage
based on the psychiatric theory of transference." Princeton Ins. Co. v. Chunmuang,
292 NJ. Super. 349, 361, 678 A.2d 1143, 1149 (App. Div. 1996) (quoted by
Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 105, 698 A.2d at 22 (Handler, J., dissenting)).
196 See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 105-06, 698 A.2d at 22
(Handler, J., dissenting).
The dissent also referenced the Board's regulation on physician sexual misconduct,
which applies to psychiatrists and gynecologists alike and states, in pertinent part:
(i) A licensee shall not engage in any other activity ... which would
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intentions of psychiatrists engaged in sexual misconduct are
comparable to those of gynecologists such as Chunmuang, and
questioned why victims of psychiatric sexual misconduct are afforded
compensatory relief while victims of sexual abuse perpetrated by
gynecologists are not. 7
The dissent further emphasized that criminal acts exclusions are
not applicable to claims of sexual misconduct based on the
mishandling of the transference phenomenon by psychiatrists.'98
Extending this reasoning to the context of sexual misconduct by a
gynecologist, Justice Handler explained that the harm resulting from
the criminal act of sexual assault also arises out of the acts of medical
malpractice, such that the malpractice includes the criminal
conduct.'9 The justice suggested that Davis should not be denied
recovery because Chunmuang's negligent care also constituted both
criminal and ethical offenses.m The dissent maintained that, because
a "gynecologist is engaged in a practice that is fraught with possible
sexual implications and involves a high risk of actual or alleged sexual
misconduct[,]" 20' affording coverage for sexual misconduct would be
consistent with the expectations of the parties despite the criminal
acts exclusion.0
Further addressing the propriety of the criminal acts exclusion,
Justice Handler declared that such exclusions should be narrowly
construed as a matter of public policy, especially in cases in which the
lead a reasonable person to believe that the activity serves the licensee's
personal prurient interest or is for the sexual arousal, the sexual
gratification or the sexual abuse of the licensee or patient.
(j) Violation . . . shall be deemed to constitute gross or repeated
malpractice... or professional misconduct ....
N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 35-6.3 (1996) (cited by Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 107 n.3,
698 A.2d at 22 n.3 (Handler,J, dissenting)).
197
See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 107, 698 A.2d at 22 (HandlerJ., dissenting).
198 See id. The L.L. v. Medical Protective Co., 362 N.W.2d 174, 179 (Wis.
Ct. App.

1984) court found that the policy language was not clear as to whether the
psychiatrist was covered for acts of malpractice that also were defined as criminal,
and subsequently construed the meaning in favor of the insured physician. See
Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 107, 698 A.2d at 23 (Handler, J., dissenting). The Vigilant
Insurance Co. v. Kambly, 319 N.W.2d 382, 384-85 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) court held a

criminal acts exclusion was not applicable in a malpractice action based on
inappropriate sexual contact between a patient and psychiatrist. See Chunmuang, 151
N.J. at 107, 698 A.2d at 23 (Handler, J., dissenting).
See Chunmuang, at 108, 698 A.2d at 23 (HandlerJ, dissenting).
200

See id.

Id.
M See id. Justice Handler also posited that the expectation of insurance coverage
would not likely induce insured physicians to engage in sexual misconduct. See id. at
108-09, 698 A.2d at 23.
201
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beneficiary of the insurance coverage is an innocent third-party
0 3
victim.Y
The dissent also cautioned that giving effect to criminal acts

exclusions would
tend to discourage reporting of physician sexual
2
misconduct.Y1

Finally, Justice Handler disagreed with the majority's contention
that, in order for Davis to recover, she must identify and prove that
portion of her damages caused solely by Chunmuang's negligent
failure to diagnose and properly treat her gynecologic condition. 5
The justice asserted that the damages flowing from the professional
negligence were not sufficiently distinct from those caused by the
criminal acts as to deny full recovery to the injured party. 0 6 The
dissent concluded that segregating the two components of the
damage award would be unrealistic under circumstances in which the
sexual contact was intertwined with the medical malpractice
. 07
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Chunmuang addressed for the
first time the issue of medical malpractice insurance coverage for
sexual assaults committed by physicians upon their patients, and held
that criminal acts exclusions are valid and consistent with public
policy.208 In arriving at this conclusion, however, the court articulated
a liberal construction of the policy indemnity provisions, finding
coverage for wrongful acts in the absence of express criminal acts
exclusions.20 9 This reasoning is contrary to the prevailing view that,
outside of the mental health area, insurers should not be required to
indemnify physicians for their intentional, criminal acts of sexual

203

See id. at 109, 698 A.2d at 23-24 (Handler, J., dissenting). As support for this

position, Justice Handler cited title 45, section 1-2(c) and (e) of the New Jersey
Statutes (statutory enactments concerning gross malpractice and professional
misconduct applied to sexual misconduct) and title 13, section 35-6.3(j) of the New
Jersey Administrative Code (equating sexual misconduct to gross malpractice and
professional misconduct). See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 109, 698 A.2d at 24 (Handler,
J., dissenting).
204 See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 109, 698 A.2d
at 24 (Handler, J., dissenting). A
disincentive to reporting is created when a patient who suffers more harm as a result
of a criminal act receives less compensation as a result of alleging the criminal
conduct. See id. at 109-10, 698 A.2d at 24 (Handler,J., dissenting).
205 See id. at 110, 698 A.2d at 24 (HandlerJ,
dissenting).
2
See id.
207

See id.

M See id. at 93, 100, 698 A.2d at 15, 19.
N9
See id. at 97-98, 698 A.2d at 18. Utilizing the "substantial nexus" test of Records,
the Chunmuang court concluded that the physician's acts of sexual misconduct
constituted a "medical incident" and were covered under the policy's indemnity
provisions. See id.; see also supra note 62 (quoting policy language concerning a
"medical incident").
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misconduct with patients regardless of the presence or absence of
exclusion clauses. °
Health-care providers should not be afforded insurance
coverage for acts of sexual abuse inflicted upon their patients,
irrespective of the presence of exclusion clauses. To require such
coverage - or, in the alternative, to deny the validity of criminal acts
exclusions - would undercut the basis of insurance contracts
between carriers and insured physicians.' Physicians, when applying
for medical malpractice insurance, do not expect to be covered for
acts of sexual assault; nor do they desire to pay higher premiums for
any court-ordered coverage. 2 In addition, law-abiding physicians
clearly oppose subsidizing, through their premiums, coverage for
other physicians engaged in such egregious, unethical conduct and it
would be patently unfair to impose such a financial burden on all
physicians owing to the misconduct of a few.212
Common sense signals that sexual assaults are not a part of
recognized professional services, and coverage for these criminal acts
are well beyond the expectations of the parties to the insurance
contract.2 4 In fact, medical students, interns, and residents, as
physicians-in-training, learn early on that sexual misconduct is not
covered by malpractice policies, and no good reason exists to reverse
these expectations now. 215 For a physician to be afforded professional
210

See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing case law and majority view

of other jurisdictions denying coverage for injuries resulting from physician sexual
contact with patients); see also Snyder v. Major, 818 F. Supp. 68, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
The Snyder court interpreted policy language defining "medical incident" that was
almost identical to the language in Chunmuang's policy. See id. The court
interpreted the policy "as unambiguously granting coverage only for liability flowing
from any act of providing medical services, and not . . . from any act occurring
during the time when a patient is visiting a doctor for the provision of medical
services." Id. (emphasis added). The plain meaning of the policy barred coverage
for the doctor's acts of sexual abuse. See id.; see also Washington Ins. Guar. Ass'n v.
Hicks, 744 P.2d 623, 625-27 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (denying coverage for sexual
misconduct by a chiropractor because the sexual acts did not constitute a medical
incident).
211 See St. Paul Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Cromeans, 771 F. Supp. 349, 352 (N.D. Ala.
1991)
(stating that "contracts insuring against intentional misconduct" violate public
policy); see also Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 76 N.J. 477, 495-96, 388 A.2d 603, 61213 (1978) (Clifford, J., dissenting).
'212
See Rivera v. Nevada Med. Liab. Ins. Co., 814 P.2d 71, 74 (Nev. 1991); see also
Hicks, 744 P.2d at 628.
213 See Rivera, 814 P.2d at 74; see also supra note 32 (reciting position of the Medical
Society of New Jersey regarding the potential effect on malpractice insurance
premiums of mandatory indemnification of criminal acts committed by physicians).
214 See Cromeans, 771 F. Supp.
at 352.
215 This is based on the Author's firsthand experience as a physician, as a Director
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liability coverage, there must be a causal relationship between the
patient's injuries and a professional act, not an unprofessional act.
Although it is unlikely that practitioners would be induced to engage
in criminal conduct by reliance on the insurability of such claims, and
equally unlikely that physicians would obtain malpractice coverage in
contemplation of violating the law," 6 there very well may remain
some deterrent effect for practicing physicians in knowing that they
would be personally liable for acts of sexual abuse if such conduct was
not covered. 7
The well-established and sound public policy position that
individuals cannot insure against their own intentional misconduct
should not be abandoned.2 " To hold otherwise would provide an
undeserved benefit to sexual abusers. Public policy should insist that
the state hold its citizens responsible for their own actions. In
addition, health-care providers should not escape financial liability
for wrongful acts simply because the acts are co-mingled with
professional services.2 '9 No other occupation is afforded such
of Medical Education at a teaching hospital, and as a Clinical Assistant Dean for a
medical school. These positions carry with them the responsibility for the training of
medical students, interns, and residents.
26 See Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Kambly, 319 N.W.2d
382, 385 (Mich. App. 1982).
2 7 See Rivera, 814 P.2d at 74.
21
See Cromeans, 771 F. Supp. at 352; see also New Mexico Physicians Mut. Liab. Co.
v. LaMure, 860 P.2d 734, 742 (N.M. 1993). The court in LaMure determined that
public policy prevents "an insured from being shielded from the negative
consequences of his crimes." Id. The LaMure court denied coverage for a physician's
criminal acts based on a determination that those acts did not constitute professional
services under the policy language, and that the policy's criminal acts exclusion was
valid and not contrary to public policy despite a state statute requiring malpractice
insurance. See id. at 741-42. Discussing the purpose of the State's medical
malpractice act and its application to the case before it, LaMure went on to state:
The Act evidences no intent to supplant or modify the coverage
provisions of LaMure's malpractice insurance, either by invalidating its
criminal acts exclusions or expanding its broad coverage provisions.
The purpose of the Act is "to promote the health and welfare of the
people of New Mexico by making available professional liability
insurance for health care providers in New Mexico." The Act is
intended to increase the number of health care providers serving the
public by facilitating their acquisition of professional liability
insurance. The Act also seeks to promote the integrity of malpractice
claims against health care providers by creating a system whereby
legitimate claims are recoverable by the injured party. The relevant
coverage and exclusion provisions of LaMure's policies are not
inconsistent with the Act's objectives. Malpractice claims under the Act
do not include claims of criminal sexual assault not committed in the
course of rendering professional health care services.
Id. at 741 (citation omitted).
219

SeeFlorig, supra note 1, at 721-31 (concluding that acts of sexual molestation in
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deference and, considering the trust inherent in the physicianpatient relationship, there is even less reason to indemnify physician
sexual misconduct.
The subrogation approach advanced by the Ambassador court
and adopted in proposed New Jersey Assembly Bill No. 1998 is not
the answer in the health-care arena. Allowing plaintiffs access to the
carriers' "deep pockets" through a subrogation theory not only
ignores basic insurance contract construction, but also opens the
door to increased costs for honest health-care providers, and
ultimately for consumers. 20 Affording coverage for criminal conduct
or rejecting policy exclusions for this behavior would increase
insurance company costs both to defend and indemnify the physician
in any legal action with the complainant as well as any subsequent
proceedings to collect from an adjudged physician wrongdoer. 2 '
Undoubtedly, these costs would be passed on to all insured
physicians.2
As an unfortunate consequence of these economic
realities, carriers, looking to minimize their own financial liability,
would be pitted against the victims of the physician misconduct.
Furthermore, this approach opens the door to require insurance
companies to compensate injured parties for punitive damages, a
concept not promoted in American jurisprudence. 23 Drawing the
lines for and against indemnification could indeed become a
formidable task. The court should follow the precedent established
in the automobile insurance cases in which drivers who commit
intentional criminal acts are denied coverage. 224
all fields of medicine, including the mental health area, are known to be harmful
and not beneficial to the patient, and cannot be considered part of the professional
services rendered even if the relationship with the patient began as a professional
service).
220 See Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 76 N.J. 477, 493, 498, 388 A.2d
603, 611,
614 (1978) (Clifford, J., dissenting); see also Snyder v. Major, 789 F. Supp. 646, 650
n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Rivera v. Nevada Med. Liab. Ins. Co., 814 P.2d 71, 74 (Nev.
1991).
221 See Snyder, 789 F. Supp. at 650
n.3.
2
See Ambassador, 76 N.J. at 498, 388 A.2d at 614 (Clifford,J., dissenting).
2
See id. at 496, 388 A.2d at 613 (Clifford, J., dissenting); see also Public Service
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 425 N.E.2d 810, 814 (N.Y. 1981).
"Under no
circumstances, however, can the insurer be compelled to indemnify Dr. Goldfarb for
punitive damages .... [T]o allow insurance coverage for such damages 'is totally to
defeat the purpose of punitive damages."' Id. (citation omitted).
224 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Malec, 104 N.J. 1, 6, 514 A.2d 832, 834-35 (1986).
Intentional act exclusion clauses are common in automobile insurance policies and
are accepted as valid limitations on coverage without offending public policy. See id.
Practically all automobile insurance policies contain exclusions for "harm
intentionally caused by the insured." Id. at 11, 514 A.2d at 837. In distinguishing
Ambassador,the court in Malec held that a specific exclusion for intentional wrongful
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Also, a patient injured by a physician's criminal act is not left
without a remedy.2 5 As is true for tort law in general, the plaintiff
may sue the physician tortfeasor directly for injuries sustained as a
result of the sexual misconduct.226 In a case such as Chunmuang, it
would not be unrealistic to apportion the damages between the acts
of professional negligence and the sexual assault.22 7 For the most
part, the separate and distinct injuries caused by the sexual
misconduct primarily would be of an emotional nature. Any physical
harm caused by Chunmuang's professional malpractice would still be
covered by his policy.22 8 Davis was clearly afforded the opportunity on
remand to prove her damages.2
Any finding by the courts requiring indemnification by
insurance companies for physician criminal behavior could also have
serious ramifications for administrative licensing proceedings. Such a
situation would create an incentive for carriers to become more
involved in defending physicians accused of sexual abuse in
disciplinary proceedings conducted before the Board of Medical
Examiners. While the Board's charge is to protect the public against
physician misconduct, the involved insurer's main interest would be
to protect its own financial interests irrespective of the public
interest, thus placing the carrier's incentives in conflict with the goals
of the Board. By contrast, when there is no finding of coverage for
sexual misconduct, the incentives of these two entities would be
aligned, or at least not at odds with each other.
Findings of fact determined at administrative proceedings are
often on point with facts pertinent to subsequent civil litigation. This
may engender preclusionary effects, thereby compelling malpractice
carriers to lodge a fierce legal fight at the administrative level.
Injured patients may also be less willing to cooperate with the Board
in physician disciplinary actions in order to avoid any risk of harming
their subsequent civil actions. The Board's goal of protecting the
public at large would be hampered because the physician wrongdoer
potentially could continue to use his medical license to assault other
patients. If an insurance carrier aggressively defending the physician
at a Board proceeding prevails because the Attorney General failed to
acts in an automobile liability insurance policy was valid and consistent with public
policy. See id. at 13, 514 A.2d at 838.
225 See Princeton Ins. Co. v. Chunmuang,
151 N.J. 80, 100-01, 698 A.2d 9, 19
(1997).
226 See id.
227 See id. at 101, 698 A.2d at 20 (O'Hern,J.,
concurring).
22
See id. at 100-01, 698 A.2d at 19.
See id. at 101, 698 A.2d at 19.
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prove the charges by a preponderance of the credible evidence, the
alleged patient-victim would then be unlikely to obtain relief in a
private civil suit, and any contemplated criminal action would surely
be dealt a fatal blow, considering that the standard of criminal
proceedings is beyond a reasonable doubt.
In licensing actions, sanctions are limited to out-of-pocket
expenses such as restitution, costs, and administrative fines,3 0 whereas
private civil suits afford compensation for pain and suffering in
addition to actual damages. Thus, the Board also may find it more
difficult to procure settlements with the physician because admissions
or no-contest pleas, along with any Board-ordered sanctions or
psychiatric rehabilitation, could have a binding effect on the parties
in later civil proceedings. If malpractice carriers are obligated to
defend the physician for acts of sexual assault, their incentive would
be to avoid settlement at the Board level, so as not to jeopardize their
position in a civil suit in which financially more would be at risk. In
any event, the involvement of malpractice insurers at the
administrative level muddies the waters and compels new litigation
strategies for all parties involved, including timing and sequence of
disciplinary and private civil proceedings.
Finally, if coverage for criminal activities becomes the rule,
malpractice carriers may have a difficult time determining their risk
or limiting their exposure; this would result in further difficulty in
premium setting. Unlike other insurance situations, in which the
insurer has some means of protecting its interests,23 1 malpractice
carriers do not possess authority to routinely interview patients or
inspect patient records in an effort to determine that risk with
insured physicians. This may lead to artificially high malpractice
premiums for all physicians.
The New Jersey Supreme Court should be applauded for
seriously addressing and upholding the criminal acts exclusion in
Chunmuang's policy despite a liberal interpretation of the policy's
coverage provisions. Regarding the coverage determination, the
court ventured further than most jurisdictions in extending coverage
for physician sexual misconduct beyond the realm of the

230

See NJ.

STAT. ANN.

§ 45:1-14 to 1-27 (West 1998) (section 25 of the Uniform

Enforcement Act establishes civil penalties for actions brought before the
professional or occupational boards as well as actions to collect or enforce civil
penalties, costs, and restitution).
231 For example, automobile liability insurers can set premiums based on driving
record data, such as points for traffic violations and accident history, and the insurers
may rely on automobile inspections.
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psychotherapist.2

2

-

Although the court settled these coverage and

exclusion clause issues, new questions have arisen since Chunmuang
was decided. In particular, the effect of recently enacted mandatory
malpractice insurance legislation on judicial interpretations of
legislative intent and public policy is yet to be determined. 3 In the
end, however, it would appear that the financial and social policy
costs associated with requiring indemnification of physician sexual
abuse would outweigh any benefit inuring to the few victims unable
to obtain civil relief from insolvent physician tortfeasors.

See Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 88, 698 A.2d at 12-13.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45: 9-19.17 (West 1998) and N.J. STAT. ANN. §
45: 5-5.3
(West 1998) (requiring malpractice insurance coverage or a comparable letter of
credit to satisfy negligence awards for physicians and podiatrists, respectively); see also
supra note 218 (discussing the conclusion in LaMure that mandatory malpractice
insurance legislation did not invalidate a criminal acts exclusion in a professional
liability policy); Jorgenson, supra note 5, at 612 n.137 ("[I]f a state has enacted
mandatory malpractice insurance coverage for practitioners, it may reasonably be
inferred that the legislative policy is to protect victims from being unable to recover
for the harm cased by the malpractice .... Any exclusion of such coverage would
therefore be narrowly construed."); Chunmuang, 151 N.J. at 87, 698 A.2d at 12.
Implying that a professional liability policy would be amended as a matter of law
when a mandatory malpractice insurance statute exists, Justice Stein stated, "Because
medical malpractice insurance is not statutorily required, determining the scope of
coverage under a malpractice policy is primarily a matter of contract interpretation."
Id.
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